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RETROACTIVITY: A STUDY IN SUPREME
COURT DOCTRINE "AS APPLIED"
JOHN BERNARD CORRt

The judicialcreation ofa new rule of law raisesthe essentialquestion whether that rule is to be appliedretroactivelyorprospectively only.
The consistency ofthe traditionalmandatoryretroactivityrulehas given
way to a moreflexible retroactivity ana sis. The change occurredin
1965 when the Supreme Courtin Linkletter v. Walker squarelfaceda
rule that, if applied retroactively, would have affected thousands of
criminalconvictions. The Linkletter doctrinehas since defined the contours offederal retroactivity ana sis to include three basic considerations: purpose of the rule in question, relianceby thepartieson the rule,
andeffect ofretroactiveapplicationon the administrationofjustice. An
examination of Supreme Court decisions since 1975 and of lowerfederal court decisions since 1971 leads Professor Corr to challenge the
utility of the retroactivitydoctrine articulatedby the Supreme Court, in
short, the logical appeal of the purpose-reliance-effect triad does not
transfer well into practicalapplication. Given the confusion and inconsistencies currentlypresentin the retroactivityanaosis of lowerfederal
courts, it is suggested that more useful guidelines be developed in this
complex area of the law. More importantly, it is also suggested that
doctrinaldevelopment should take into account the practicalproblems
of applying doctrine, andnot merely such considerationsasfairness or
the abstract logical appealof a doctrine.
These questions [of retroactivity] are among the most difficult of
those which have engaged the attention of [the] courts ....
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, 1940'
Chief Justice Hughes could not have known that he lived in the good old
days, when retroactivity was simple. Only in the last twenty years have we
come to appreciate just how difficult retroactivity analysis can be.
At first glance, retroactivity analysis seems quite straightforward. It is a
process by which courts determine whether a new judge-made rule of law
should be applied to events arising before the new law was promulgated. In
order that those determinations be marked with some degree of fairness and
t Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary. A.B. 1963 & A.M. 1964, John Carroll University; Ph.D. 1971, Kent State University; J.D.
1978, Georgetown University.
Thanks are due to my research assistant Kenneth H. Boone, whose resourceful and unerringly accurate efforts contributed measurably to this work. I owe a particular debt to my colleague, Fred Schauer, who was a source both of inspiration and of detailed and insightful
commentary.
Research for this article was supported in part by a grant from the College of William and
Mary.
1. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
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predictability, retroactivity analysis involves an attempt to develop rules or
guidelines helpful to judges in their efforts to make just retroactivity decisions.
Implicit in that effort is the prospect that in an appropriate circumstance a
given decision will not have retroactive effect, but will apply only to cases or
events arising after some particular date. Much of the difficulty in retroactivity analysis has arisen in the attempt to formulate workable rules or guidelines
for determining when a decision will be held wholly or partially prospective.
Matters were not always so difficult. Indeed, prospectivity was alien to
the common law, which simply assumed that new decisions would be applied
retroactively. 2 Early American writers tended to treat displaced law as though
it had never been the law.3 In fact, this view is implicit in Marbury v.
Madison,4 in which Chief Justice Marshall assumed that a decision of unconstitutionality was simply a declaration of a preexisting state of affairs and rendered the law a complete nullity. This assumption was consistent with the
concept of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that judges are discoverers
rather than makers of law; thus, the need for any form of retroactivity analysis
did not become obvious until well into the twentieth century. Some awakening has occurred in the federal courts in fits and starts over the past fifty
years,5 but it was not until 1965, when the Supreme Court decided Linkletter v.
Walker,6 that retroactivity analysis truly came to the fore.
Linkletter involved a petition for retroactive application of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 7 in which the exclusionary rule
was applied to warrantless searches conducted by state officers in violation of
the fourth amendment. To apply Mapp retroactively would have affected convictions in "thousands of cases" 8 decided prior to Mapp, so in Linkletter the
Supreme Court was forced to ponder whether in some circumstances it might
be more appropriate to make a new rule partly or completely prospective in
application. The Court concluded that the way to approach retroactivity was
to "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history
of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation."9 The Court also considered the degree to which parties had relied on the pre-Mapp standards and the
2. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-27 (1965).
3. See 2 J. WINTHROP, THE HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM 1630 TO 1649, 289 (1826),
quotedin Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of Moralsin Early America, in AMERICAN LAW AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 53 (L. Friedman & H. Scheiber ed. 1978):

[W]e have no laws diametrically opposite to those of England, for then they must be
contrary to the law of God and of right reason, which the learned in those laws have

anciently and still do hold forth as the fundamental basis of their laws, and that if anything hath been otherwise established, it was an errour and not a law, being against the
intent of the lawmakers.

4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. For a good discussion of cases and literature on retroactivity prior to the 1960s, see Levy,
Realist Jurisprudenceand Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1960).
6. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8. 381 U.S. at 636.
9. Id. at 629.
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consequences retroactivity would have on the administration ofjustice. 10 Two
years after Linkletter, in Stovall v. Denno, 1I the Supreme Court solidified those
three elements-purpose, reliance, and effect-as a foundation upon which

much (but not all) of the future retroactivity analysis of the Supreme Court
would proceed. Stovall thereupon became an integral feature of what this article will term the "Linkletter/Stovall doctrine." Similarly, in Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson,' 2 decided six years after Linketter, the Supreme Court adopted a

Linkletter-like doctrine for many civil cases subject to retroactivity analysis.
Link/etter, therefore, had two important consequences. Its immediate effect
was to make the rule of Mapp prospective; 13 its effect over time was to create a

minor industry in which judges, practicing lawyers, and academics labored to
establish just and predictable rules governing the applicability of law-chang-

ing cases. 14

The surge of interest in retroactivity subsequent to Link/etter has never

completely abated, but as the pace of Supreme Court proclamations on the
subject has slowed,'

5

the Link/etter/Stovall doctrine has assumed the appear-

ance of greater definition and diminished malleability. It is, therefore, an opportune time to examine that doctrine and related analyses as they have

matured-not so much for the quality of thought behind them, for that has
been done many times,' 6 but to determine the utility of Link/etter/Stovall and

other approaches in trial and lower appellate courts, the arenas in which the
day-to-day work of our judicial system is accomplished. No amount of doctrinal beauty, after all, can compensate for the disutility of a standard in application, so an evaluation of the Linkletter/Stovall standard must consider how it

works as well as how it looks. Toward that end, this article will summarize
Supreme Court decisions involving retroactivity since 1975, the year in which
a summary was last undertaken.' 7 The cases are addressed in chronological

order, largely so that we may see the development of retroactivity from the
stance of the lower courts that are trying to implement the doctrine. The arti-

cle will then examine how well Supreme Court retroactivity doctrines actually
10. Id. at 637-38.
11. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). One student of the Linkletter doctrine believes the purpose-relianceeffect test was not clearly presented until Stovall. See Beytagh, Ten Years ofNon-Retroactivity: A
Critique and a Proposal,61 VA. L. REv. 1557, 1566 (1975).
12. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
13. 381 U.S. at 640.
14. The efforts of the Supreme Court until 1975 are chronicled in Beytagh, supra note 11.
For other useful scholarly discussions, see, e.g., Currier, Time and Change in Judge Made Law:
Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965); Haddad, RetroactivityShould be Rethought: A
Callfor the End ofthe Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CEuM. L., CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE Sci. 417
(1969); McNulty, Corporations and the Intertemporal Conflict of Laws, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 12
(1967); Mishkin, Foreword- The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and
Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56 (1965); Ostrager, RetroactivityandProspectivity fSpreme Court ConstitutionalInterpretations, 19 N.Y.L. FORUM 289 (1973); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and
Due Process: A Reply to ProfessorAfishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (1966); Traynor, Quo Vadis,
Prospective Overruling: A Question of JudicialResponsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977).
15. Since 1975 the Supreme Court has addressed a retroactivity issue in less than ten cases.
16. See, e.g., the sources supra note 14.
17. See Beytagh, supra note 11.
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work in the lower courts, using as a data base an investigation of more than
two hundred federal district and circuit court decisions published since the end
of 1971.18 By treating Supreme Court pronouncements as preliminary, and
focusing closely upon the application of those pronouncements in the lower
courts, we can explore not only the full depth of retroactivity doctrine, but also
in a broader sense evaluate the role of the Supreme Court as lawmaker.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT

1975-1982

Professor Beytagh's synthesis of Supreme Court decisions addressing the
Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron retroactivity doctrines included cases decided
as late as June 1975.19 Thereafter the rate with which retroactivity issues were

brought before the Court dropped significantly. Decisions that have been
made, however, provide important indications that within the Supreme Court
the Linkletter/Stovall approach, at least, has lost momentum and is under
pressure. The sources of that pressure are diverse; they include the creation of
procedural requirements that restrict the use of Linkletter; the continued use of

older retroactivity doctrines, the scope of which probably remains inviolate to
both Linkletter/Slovall and Chevron expansion; and the articulation of proposals that Linkletter/Stovall should be entirely abandoned in determining the
retroactivity of certain important categories of cases.
The first retroactivity case20 to be decided after June 1975 helps demon18. Federal cases were used because the federal courts are peculiarly subject to the supervision of the Supreme Court. By contrast, state courts addressing state issues are under no obligation to use the retroactivity rules of the Supreme Court, Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co.,
287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932), and many states have developed their own approaches to retroactivity.
See, e.g., Perrello & Golembiewski, Retroactivity of Caliornia Supreme Court Decisions., A Procedural Step Toward Fairness, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 403 (1981).
Cases decided in the last decade are particularly useful because it was only in late 1971 that
the Supreme Court clearly adopted a Linkletter/Stovall-like retroactivity analysis for certain categories of civil litigation. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19. Beytagh, supra note 11.
20. Actually, the very first retroactivity question to be decided after June 1975 was outside
the scope of standard retroactivity analysis entirely. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977),
arose in the wake of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller had altered the standard for
separating obscenity from first amendment protected speech established earlier in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The rules enunciated in Miller were, at one and the same
time, beneficial and harmful to criminal defendants who might have anticipated the application of
Memoirs to their cases. The Supreme Court had already decided that the benefits of Miller would
be retroactively available to criminal defendants, Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102
(1974), and Marks resolved the question of the retroactivity of those portions of Miller harmful to
defendants. That question was one of constitutional dimensions outside the scope of retroactivity
analyses such as Linkletter, so the Court simply used Marks to restate the principle that under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments changes in case law operating to the detriment of criminal defendants could not be applied retroactively. 430 U.S. at 196.
Interestingly, the conviction of Miller, the original defendant in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973), was ultimately allowed to stand. After the Supreme Court announced its new rule in
Miller and remanded the case to the state courts, the state appellate court affirmed the conviction
again, this time with a nod from the Supreme Court. Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974)
(appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question). The short time lag between remand
and reaffirmation of the conviction suggests that Miller did not get a new trial, but only a review
of his original conviction under the new rule of obscenity the Supreme Court announced on his
first appeal. Assuming, as appears clearly to be the case, that the Supreme Court intended Miller
to obtain the benefit of the new rule announced in his own case, the absence of a retrial raises a
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strate the manner in which Linkletter/Stovall has been subdued. Hankerson v.
North Carolina2 l addressed the retroactivity of Mullaney v. Wilbur,22 in which
the Court had held that jury instructions which require a criminal defendant
to carry a burden of proof as to any element of a crime violate due process. In
Hankerson the jury had received such instructions, and defendant made a
Mullaney objection for the first time when his case came before the North
Carolina Supreme Court on direct review. That court concluded that the instructions in Hankerson would have been error under the rule of Mullaney,
but that Mullaney had no retroactive effect because the impact upon the administration of justice of releasing or retrying numerous convicted criminals
would be devastating.
The United States Supreme Court took a different approach to Hankerson. At first the Court seemed to reaffirm the established Linkletter/Stovall
23
approach to retroactivity. Citing primarily to Ivan V v. City ofNew York, a
Linkletter offspring, Justice White's opinion for the Court restated the holding
of several cases in the Linkletter line that when the primary purpose of a new
rule is to enhance substantially the truth-finding function of criminal trials,
neither reliance nor considerations of the impact24of the rule upon the administration of justice can justify only prospectivity.
If that had been the end of Justice White's analysis, Hankerson would
have been a routine reinforcement of standard Linkletter/Stovall doctrine. In
a footnote, however, Justice White also sought to ease the apprehension of the
lower court that retroactivity for Mullaney would produce a wholesale release
of convicted criminals. It was "unlikely," Justice White commented,
that prior to Mullaney many defense lawyers made appropriate objections to jury instructions incorporating those presumptions. Petitioner made none here. The North Carolina Supreme Court passed
on the validity of the instructions anyway. The States, if they wish,
may be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and
valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is2 a waiver of any
claim of error. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 30. 5
question as to what is meant by retroactivity. Should, for example, Miller have received a retrial
on the theory that under the new rule his strategy at trial would have been different? If so, what
burden, if any, should he have had to demonstrate how the old rule distorted the facts or his
strategy at trial? The other side of that question, of course, involves a determination by the state
courts as to the method they should use to decide when a command of retroactivity may be satisfied merely by appellate review. Should, for example, the lower courts borrow from Linkletter a
consideration of the impact of the new rule upon truth determinations at trial as a standard for
decidins when a case should be retried, as opposed to merely rereviewed? Another case in which
retroactivity was a lesser issue came down in 1976. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam) and infra note 115.
21. 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
22. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The substantive holding in Mullaney was later undercut significantly in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
23. 407 U.S. 203 (1972). Ivan V made retroactive the decision of the Supreme Court in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which required juvenile courts to use the reasonable doubt

standard.

24. 432 U.S. at 241, and cases cited therein. The conclusion in Hankerson, therefore, was

that Mullaney would apply retroactively.
25. Id. at 244 n.8.
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Thus, the suggestion was made that in collateral pleas for relief, retroactivity could be claimed only by those who had raised the issue in their own
trials. The way in which such a rule would restrict the effect of a decision for
retroactivity was demonstrated in Wainwright v. Sykes, 26 decided a week after
Hankerson. Wainwright was not a retroactivity case, but involved a petition
for habeas corpus on the ground that certain evidence used at trial should
have been inadmissible. Defendant had not raised the issue at trial as required by state law, and state courts rejected the plea when it was raised for
the first time on direct appeal. The Supreme Court also rejected the prisoner's
plea for relief, reasoning that under the established line of authority habeas
relief was unavailable to persons who did not raise their objections before the
state courts in a timely manner, unless it could be shown both that there was
good cause for the failure to object and that the defendant had been
27
prejudiced by what had followed.

Read in light of Wainwright and earlier cases, 28 Justice White's footnote
in Hankerson suggests that large segments of an important body of retroactivity cases--collateral attacks on prior criminal convictions-might as a practical matter simply be beyond the scope of the traditional Linkletter/Stova/l
approach. 29 Only those petitioners who objected to the application of existing
law or who could meet the Wainwright standards for failing to have done so
would be entitled to make a collateral plea for the application of a law-changing decision made subsequent to their conviction. Because it is not a retroactivity case, Wainwright does not intimate whether its "cause and prejudice"
standard can be met when a party failed to object to existing law simply because the question was novel. 30 But Wainwright and Hankerson do at least
suggest that even a decision granting retroactivity will benefit only those parties with the foresight to have anticipated the law-changing case.
Wainwright and requirements for timely objection aside, Hankerson was
also significant for the revival of another retroactivity approach that, while
faithful to the roots of the Linkletter/Stovall doctrine, threatened to limit the
doctrine as it had evolved. Justice Marshall stated the idea in his concurrence
in Hankerson: the benefit of retroactive application of changes in constitutional law should be accorded to all criminal convictions not yet final when the
Supreme Court announces its change. 3' For Justice Marshall, that principle
was a restatement of a view he had held for several years, 32 but Hankerson
26. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
27. Id. at 87.
28. The timely objection requirement discussed in Wainwright has a history predating
Hankerson. Id. at 77. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501

(1976).
29. Justice White's footnote in Hankerson spoke of insulating "past convictions" from the
consequences of retroactivity, 432 U.S. at 244 n.8, but at that time the Court was silent about the
use of a timely objection rule to stifle pleas in pending cases for retroactivity.
30. Recently the Supreme Court refused to address that question. See infra text accompanying note 84.
31. 432 U.S. at 245 (Marshall, J., concurring).
32. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 665-66 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring in
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was the first time Justice Powell rallied to that standard. 33

The idea was first set out in 1969, when Justice Harlan dissented from a
decision making a law-changing decision prospective:
Upon reflection, I can no longer accept the rule first announced two
years ago. . . which permits this Court to apply a "new" constitu-

tional rule entirely prospectively, while making an exception only for
the particular litigant whose case was chosen as the vehicle for estab-

lishing that rule. Indeed, I have concluded that Linkletter was right
in insisting that all "new" rules of constitutional law must, at a minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct
review3 4by this Court at the time the "new" decision is handed

down.

Justice Harlan explained that his criticism of the existing rule, which in some

cases allowed complete prospectivity, did not focus merely upon the unfairness
of giving relief to a chance beneficiary while other similarly situated litigants
were not so favored. The criticism also took account of the damage general
prospectivity could do the judicial rulemaking process. Positing a situation in
which an appellate court announced a new rule subsequently adopted by the

Supreme Court in a separate case-one in which the Supreme Court made its
rule prospective-Justice Harlan wondered whether the Court would find it-

self obligated to reverse the appellate tribunal that had anticipated the new
rule simply because the decision of the Supreme Court had been for prospec-

tivity.35 In the same dissent Justice Harlan also made clear that in most circumstances he would deny the benefit of retroactivity to collateral attacks

upon criminal convictions. 36 But his advocacy of an approach that would aupart and dissenting in part) (criminal cases on direct review should be accorded the benefit of
retroactivity).
33. 432 U.S. at 246.48.
34. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's
suggestion that he, not the majority, was truer to Linkletter referred to the passages in the majority
opinion in Linkletter in which the Court held "that a change in the law will be given effect while a
case is on direct review" and "no distinction [will be] drawn between civil and criminal litigation."
381 U.S. at 627. The intervening case that, in Justice Harlan's opinion, deviated from the true
principle of Linkletter was Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), in which the Court decided a
retroactivity question in favor of prospectivity, save for the case at bar. That particular litigation
received the benefit of the law changing rule:
[The situation presents] an unavoidable consequence of the necessity that constitutional
adjudications not stand as mere dictum. Sound policies of decision-making, rooted in
the command of Article III of the Constitution that we resolve issues solely in concrete
eases or controversies, and in the possible effect upon the incentive of counsel to advance
contentions requiring a change in the law, militate against denying Wade and Gilbert the
benefit of today's decisions. Inequity arguably results from according the benefit of a
new rule to the parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other litigants
similarly situated in the trial or appellate process who have raised the same issue. But
we regard the fact that the parties involved are chance beneficiaries as an insignificant
cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making.
Id. at 301. Justice Harlan had concurred in the prospectivity result in Stovall,id. at 303, a position
he later renounced. 394 U.S. at 258-59.
35. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 260. It should be noted that while Justice Marshall embraced Justice Harlan's
proposal to accord the benefit of retroactivity to all convictions not yet final, he disagreed with
Justice Harlan's view that retroactivity might not be appropriate at all for collateral matters. On
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tomatically apply to new constitutional rules retroactively to pending criminal
cases has persisted, impeding the progress of the majority's contrary view.
Two years later Justice Harlan elaborated upon the same themes. Accusing the majority of adopting a rule that turned the lower courts into "automatons," he attacked as "indefensible" the practice of "[slimply fishing one
case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing
new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases
subsequently to flow by unaffected. . .. ,,37 Appalling as the refusal to make
new constitutional rules retroactive to pending criminal cases seemed to Justice Harlan, he saw an obvious difference when the plea before the Court was
for retroactivity for collateral attacks:
While men languish in jail, not uncommonly for over a year, awaiting a first trial on their guilt or innocence, it is not easy to justify
expending substantial quantities of the time and energies of judges,
prosecutors, and defense lawyers litigating the validity under present
law of criminal
convictions that were perfectly free from error when
38
made final.
Whatever the merit of his position, Justice Harlan was never able to attract a
majority of the Court during his tenure, 39 and there came a time when his
view seemed on its way to sure demise.4 0 Justice Powell's alignment with Justice Marshall on the issue in Hankerson, therefore, was important in keeping
the flame alive.
Following Hankerson, the Court was silent on retroactivity issues until
41
January 1979, when it released two per curiam opinions. Harlin v. Missouri
and Lee v. Missouri42 addressed the retroactivity of Duren v. Missouri,43 in
which a provision of state law permitting women to abstain from jury duty
was stricken as violating the sixth amendment right to a jury pool representative of the community. Neither Harlin nor Lee was of fundamental importance, but the cases did add some information to Justice White's terse footnote
in Hankerson. Harlin indicated that the absence of a timely objection would
not be fatal to a collateral attack if state courts somehow waived the defect,"4
that point Justice Marshall preferred a Linkletter/Stovall approach. Williams v. United States,
401 U.S. 646, 666 (1971). Justice Powell, on the other hand, seems to have accepted the totality of
Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity. Hankerson, 432 U.S. at 248.

37. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
38. Id. at 691. Justice Harlan also pointed out that in civil cases the overriding interest of
society in finality made collateral attacks on final judgments almost unthinkable. He noted, "This

is not to suggest that civil and criminal collateral attack ought necessarily to be precisely congruent in the federal system. But certainly it illustrates that the law has always perceived collateral
attack as a problem quite different from direct appeal." Id. at 683 n.2.
39. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 656-58 (1971).
40. See Beytagh, supra note 11, at 1576-79.

41. 439 U.S. 459 (1979) (per curiam).
42. 439 U.S. 461 (1979) (per curiam).

43. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
44. 439 U.S. at 459:
The record did not reflect that petitioner had raised this objection in timely fashion in
the trial court, but because the trial court had considered and rejected the contention on
its merits in connection with petitioner's motion for a new trial, the Missouri Supreme
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and both cases show that the requirement of a timely objection, which Justice
White's footnote in Hankerson had attached only to jury instructions, went to
other matters of law as well. As the opinion in Lee stated:
We note that in any case in which a jury was sworn subsequent to
Taylor v. Louisiana and the fair-cross-section claim based on exclusion of women was rejected on direct review or in state collateral
proceedings because of the defendant's failure to assert the claim in
timely fashion, relief is unavailable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [federal
for having failed
habeas corpus] unless the petitioner can show cause
45
to raise his claim properly in the state courts.
The Supreme Court decided only one retroactivity case in 1980. Brown v.
Louisiana46 involved the retroactivity of Burch v. Louisiana,47 in which the
Court had held that convictions for nonpetty offenses by nonunanimous juries
of six persons or less violated the sixth amendment. Justice Brennan's opinion
for the Court presented the standard three-factor analysis, and stressed the
primacy of the purpose to be served by a new rule. Justice Brennan concluded
that the purpose of Burch was to preserve the right to a jury trial and, at the
same time, to protect the accuracy of fact determinations at trial. Thus, Brown
determined that Burch was to be applied retroactively. 48 Justice Powell's concurrence in Brown restated the view he first adopted in Hankerson-lawchanging decisions should be applied retroactively to all criminal cases pending direct review.49 Moreover, Justice Stevens also adhered to that view.
Counting Justice Marshall-who voted with the plurality in Brown but who
has long espoused the view to which Justices Powell and Stevens are recent
converts-three members of the 1980 Court believed that retroactivity should
be automatic for changes of law relevant to pending criminal cases. Justice
Harlan's view, although not yet adopted by any majority of the Court, had
shown surprising vitality.
An important retroactivity decision was delivered by the Court early in
1981. FirestoneTire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord5 ° involved a defendant who filed
a motion to disqualify plaintiff's attorney. When the trial court denied the
motion, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on
the theory that such a denial was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.51 The
appellate court disagreed, but made its holding purely prospective-not appliThe highest state court havCourt reviewed the issue under its "plain error" rule ....
ing reached and decided this issue, its judgment is subject to review in this Court.
See also Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), a direct appeal of a criminal conviction, in
which the Supreme Court held that "[a]lIthough petitioners did not raise the jury trial issue in the
trial court, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that under state law it could consider petitioners'
claim, and it disposed of that claim. . . . The federal question therefore is properly raised in this
Court." Id. at 133 n.5. Burch is not a retroactivity case.
45. 439 U.S. at 462. Accord Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 459 (1979).
46. 447 U.S. 323 (1980).
47. 441 U.S. 130 (1979).

48.
49.
50.
51.

447 U.S. at 327-29.
Id at 337.
449 U.S. 368 (1981).
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
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cable even to the case at bar-in light of its prior rule under which the appeal
was permissible. 52 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall,
reversed the decision of the appellate court in favor of prospectivity, but upon
a basis that took the decision outside the scope of Linkletter. As Justice Marshall wrote:
the finality requirement embodied in § 1291 is jurisdictional in nature. If the appellate court finds that the order from which a party
seeks to appeal does not fall within the statute, its inquiry is over. A
court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is
without jurisdiction, and thus, by definition,
a jurisdictional ruling
53
may never be made prospective only.
That analysis has a history deeper than those few cryptic sentences, devoid of any citations to authority, would suggest. Early in the 1970s the
Supreme Court began to fashion an exception to standard Linkletter/Stovall
retroactivity analysis for cases in which certain fundamental rights were at
stake. In United States v. UnitedStates Coin & Currency,54 a forfeiture action
the Court treated as equivalent to a criminal prosecution, a narrow majority of
the Court made retroactive its previous holding that federal tax statutes requiring gamblers to register and pay gambling taxes violated the fifth amendment freedom from self-incrimination.55 The decisions at issue, Justice
Harlan wrote, "dealt with the kind of conduct that cannot constitutionally be
punished in the first instance. These cases held that gamblers in [the party in
interest's] position had the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in the face
of the statute's command that they submit reports which could incriminate
them." 56 A determination that such cases demand retroactive application,
Justice Harlan reasoned,
follows afortiorifrom those decisions mandating the retroactive application of those new rules which substantially improve the accuracy of the factfinding process at trial. In those cases, retroactivity
was held required because the failure to employ such rules at the trial
meant there was a significant chance that innocent men had been
wrongfully punished in the past. In the case before us, however,
even the use of impeccable factfinding procedures could not legitimate a verdict decreeing forfeiture, for we have held that the conduct
being penalized is constitutionally immune from punishment. No
circumstances57 call more for the invocation of a rule of complete
retroactivity.
52. 449 U.S. at 372-73 (citing In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377, 378-79
(8th Cir. 1980)).
53. Id. at 379.
54. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
55. The cases at issue were Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Marchetti v.

United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
56. 401 U.S. at 723.
57. Id. at 723-24. Justice Harlan added a footnote to restate his view that when a criminal
case has not yet become final before the law-changing decision is announced, retroactivity should

ipso facto be granted. .d. at 724 n.13.
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Two years later, in Robinson v. Nel,58 the Supreme Court accorded retroactive effect to its decision in Waller v. Florida,59 in which the Court had held
that the use of city and state law to afford two separate prosecutions for the
same offense violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the breakthrough
in retroactivity analysis that occurred in Linkletter made it possible to contemplate prospectivity for cases such as Waller. Neither prospectivity nor Linkletter/Stovall, however, were appropriate devices for double jeopardy:
The guarantee against double jeopardy is significantly different from
procedural guarantees held in the Linkletter line of cases to have prospective effect only. While this guarantee, like the others, is a constitutional right of the criminal defendant, its practical result is to
to prescribe proprevent a trial from taking place at all, rather than
60
cedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial.
Both United States Coin and Robinson justify their retroactivity result
without a Linkletter analysis in important part because Linkletter/Stovall affected constitutionally mandated matters of procedure, and was thus different
from the substantive rights of freedom from self-incrimination and double
jeopardy. That logic might have carried the Supreme Court to automatic retroactivity in Gosa v. Mayden6 1 as well. Gosa resolved the retroactivity of
O'Callahanv. Parker,62 in which the Court had held that armed forces personnel were not subject to trial by court martial for nonservice offenses. Concluding that a Linkletter/Stovall approach was the correct method for addressing
the retroactivity question, Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion distinguished
United States Coin on the ground that it, unlike Gosa, involved conduct that
ought not to have been punished in the first place. 63 Less convincingly, Justice
Blackmun rejected the approach of Robinson because it, in some not clearly
specified way, was different. 64 Only three members of the Court, under the
by United
leadership of Justice Marshall, thought Gosa should be controlled
65
States Coin and Robinson because it was a jurisdictional matter.
Justice Marshall's dissent in Gosa is useful for making explicit the idea
that, at least in the eyes of a strong minority of the Court, United States Coin
58. 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
59. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
60. 409 U.S. at 509. Although Robinson is mentioned quite often in consonance with United
States Coin, see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2589 (1982), at no point in his
opinion did Justice Rehnquist mention UnitedStates Coin.
Also of some interest is that Robinson was a habeas petition, suggesting that when substantive
and procedural issues may be distinguished, the Court is of one voice in holding that substantive
questions should not be affected by the collateral or direct nature of the case in which retroactivity

is sought.

61. 413 U.S. 665 (1973).
62. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
63. 413 U.S. at 677.
64. Justice Blackmun explained that Robinson was different because it held that "guarantees
not related to procedural rules 'cannot, for retroactivity purposes, be lumped conveniently together in terms of analysis."' Id. at 678.
65. Id. at 694. The discussion of United States Coin, Robinson, and Gosa relies in part on
Professor Beytagh's work. See Beytagh, supra note 11, at 1579-91.
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and Robinson reached a result of automatic retroactivity outside the scope of
the Linkletter doctrine because they involved jurisdictional questions as well
as nonprocedural constitutional rights. The decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risord,66 therefore, did not break new ground. Instead, it reas-

serted the jurisdictional basis for United States Coin and Robinson that Justice
Marshall and others had articulated in Gosa. Moreover, Risjord revived that
analysis in a context involving no substantive right of any party, but only the
purely procedural question of the timing of an appeal. Apart from representing a vindication of the dissent in Gosa, Risjord indicated that the Linkletter/Stovall approach would no longer be appropriate for law-changing
decisions that restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of a court. 67 Had Risord
been the final word, such decisions could never have been primarily prospective in application. As subsequent decisions demonstrate, however, Risjord
was far from final.
The other 1981 case to address a question of retroactivity was GTU4 Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.68 The primary question in Gz/f Offshore was the
applicability of Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt 69 to cases arising under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 70 Liepelt required a trial court to instruct the jury in cases arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act that
personal injury awards are not subject to federal income taxation. 7 1 Liepelt,
however, was decided while G-uf Offshore was pending on appeal, so the defendant in Gruf Offshore also raised the argument that Liepelt should have
only prospective application.
In a footnote to Gul Offshore, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court rejected the prospectivity argument as "insubstantial. ' 72 When a change in law
occurs while a case is on direct appeal, he wrote, an appellate court must apply
the new law to the case before it. Exceptions to that principle which might be
permitted under Bradley v. School Board of Richmond,73 Justice Powell explained, could not be activated in private civil suits "where the change does
not extinguish a cause of action but merely requires a retrial on damages
before a properly instructed jury." 74 The Bradley decision cited by Justice
Powell is part of a line of cases calling for nearly automatic retroactivity for
civil cases pending on appeal, a line of cases that had its antecedents in the era
of Chief Justice Marshall. In that period, when Blackstone's advocacy of automatic retroactivity for law-changing decisions still enjoyed preponderant influence, the Supreme Court decided UnitedStates v. Schooner Peggy.75 There
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

449 U.S. 368
Id at 379.
453 U.S. 473
444 U.S. 490
43 U.S.C. §§

(1981).
(1981).
(1980).
1331-1356 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

71. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
72. 453 U.S. at 486 n.16.

73. 416 U.S. 696, 716-17 (1974). The exception to automatic retroactivity might arise when
retroactivity would work "manifest injustice," id. at 716, but that term is left undefined in Bradley.
74. 453 U.S. at 486 n.16.
75. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103 (1801).
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the Chief Justice wrote that appellate courts were obligated to apply the law as
it currently exists, including changes intervening between the time of trial and
final resolution of the appeal.76 Later cases demonstrated that the principle
was not limited to intervening legislation, but also included law-changing activity in which the basis was "constitutional, statutory, or judicial, [or even]
where the change is made by an administrative agency acting pursuant to legislative authorization. ' 77 How, then, does the line of authority emanating
from Schooner Peggy exist alongside Linkletter and Chevron?

Easily enough, as it happens. Justice Blackmun's opinion in Bradley
drew the key distinction:
This Court in the past has recognized a distinction between the application of a change in the law that takes place while a case is on direct
review, on the one hand, and its effect on a final judgment under
collateral attack, on the other hand. Linklelter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
78
618, 627 (1965). We are concerned here only with direct review.
From the beginning, then, Linkletter was never intended to apply to civil cases
pending before a court on direct review when a change of law occurs. For that
sort of litigation, automatic retroactivity was commanded by Schooner
Peggy.7 9 Ironically, the original idea in the Linkletter criminal cases-that
retroactive benefits should be accorded to all cases pending on direct reviewsuffered through a decade of inattention or outright rejection in criminal cases
heard by the Court in the 1970s, while a substantially similar idea remained
vital in civil matters.
The first five months of 1982 were quiet for the Supreme Court in the area
of retroactivity. Only a few cases dealing with the developing rule of Wainwright 80 had even secondary significance for retroactivity doctrine, but they
suggest that the Wainwright failure-to-object rule may preempt a significant
body of cases in which Linkletter/Stovall decisions once held sway. In Rose v.
Lundy8 the Court held that a "mixed" petition for habeas corpus, consisting
of issues that were raised in a timely fashion in state court and issues that were
not so raised, could not be entertained in a federal court. A month later the
Court held that under the Wainwright "cause and prejudice" test,8 2 "the futility of presenting an objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause
for a failure to object at trial."8 3 And, tantalizingly, the Court felt the cases
before it did not require it to:
76. Id at 110.
77. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 282 (1969) (citations omitted). Only five years
after the Supreme Court made Schooner Peggy applicable to intervening agency decisions, however, the Court reversed its position. Removing agency changes from the reach of Schooner
Peggy, the Court directed instead that such a case should be remanded to the agency, which will
then make its own retroactivity determination. NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local
347, 417 U.S. 1, 10 n.10 (1974). See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
78. 416 U.S. at 710-11 (footnotes omitted).
79. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 110.
80. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
81. 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982).

82. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
83. Engle v. Issac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1572 (1982).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

decide whether the novelty of a constitutional claim ever establishes
cause for a failure to object. We might hesitate to adopt a rule that
would require trial counsel either to exercise extraordinary vision or
to object to every aspect of the proceedings in the hope that some
aspect might mask a latent constitutional claim. On the other hand,
later discovery of a constitutional defect unknown at the time of trial
84
does not invariably render the original trial fundamentally unfair.
Finally, in a third case the Court concluded that Wainwright barred a collateral attack upon a criminal conviction in which the objection was not timely,
even if the same issue could have been raised on direct review under the
"plain error" doctrine. 85
As they relate to retroactivity questions, therefore, Wainwright and its
progeny now permit collateral attacks upon prior convictions on the ground
that the law has changed when: (1) a prisoner can show that he made a timely
objection; (2) the state waives its timely objection rule; or (3) the prisoner can
meet the "cause and prejudice" exception to Wainwright. As to the third possibility, it is not at all clear that the Supreme Court will find "cause" in the
novelty of a new rule. Beyond those apparently limited exceptions, Wainwright now acts as a bar to collateral attacks upon prior convictions.
June 1982 proved to be as important in retroactivity matters as the previous five months had been quiet. In Diedrich v. Commissioner8 6 the Court held
that donors of property who attach a condition requiring their donees to pay
applicable federal gift taxes must themselves recognize taxable income to the
extent that the gift tax owed exceeds the donor's adjusted basis in the property.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger took up the retroactivity issue in
one cryptic footnote:
Petitioners argue that even if this Court holds that a donee realizes
income on a conditional gift to the extent that the gift exceeds the
adjusted basis, that holding should be applied prospectively and
should not apply to the taxpayers in this case. In this case, however,
there was no dispositive Eighth Circuit holding prior to the decision
on review. In addition, this Courtfrequently has applied decisions
which have altered the tax law and applied the clarified law to the
facts of the case before it. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1970).87
Unfortunately, '"frequently" is an assertion of fact rather than a standard. The
lower courts are thus left to ponder the circumstances in which tax decisions
should be made retroactive.
United States v. Johnson,88 by contrast, reflected an attempt to present a
more thoughtful approach to retroactivity analysis. Johnson addressed the ret84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 1573 (footnotes omitted).
United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982).
102 S. Ct. 2414 (1982).
Id. at 2420 n.10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Note that the quoted material

disregards the possibility that the taxpayer could have relied upon decisions in other circuits or
even upon a blank slate.

88. 102 S.Ct. 2579 (1982).
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roactivity of the holding of the Supreme Court in Payton v. New York 89 that
"the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make a routine felony arrest." 90
By a five to four vote, Johnson made Payton retroactive, but the scope of retroactivity and the manner in which the decision was cast were more important
than the immediate result. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun announced that the three-factor purpose-reliance-effect test-which he associated primarily with Stovall v. Denno 9 -would no longer be applicable to lawchanging fourth amendment decisions affecting criminal litigation that was
not yet final. Instead, the Court held that fourth amendment litigation not yet
final would automatically be afforded the benefit of retroactivity-a 9position
2
akin to that which Justice Harlan espoused more than a decade ago.
Justice Blackmun reached that decision by recasting much of existing
criminal retroactivity analysis. There were three categories of decisions, he

explained, that had never been subject to the three-factor test of Stovall. The
retroactivity of these cases had been decided merely "through application of a
threshold test."' 93 Those categories were: (1) cases in which the Court "merely
has applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations;" (2) rules

of criminal procedure that represented "'a clear break with the past;'" and (3)
rulings "that a trial court lacked authority to convict or punish a criminal de-

fendant in the first place." 94 In all those circumstances, Justice Blackmun
wrote, retroactivity was compelled without resort to a Stovall analysis. Payton, he acknowledged, fit none of those catagories, but that did not make it a
decision subject to the three-factor retroactivity test of Stovall. Instead, it
meant that Justice Harlan had been correct from the beginning-fourth
all
amendment decisions such as Payton should "be applied retroactively to 95
rendered."
was
decision
the
time
the
at
final
yet
not
were
that
convictions
The result, of course, is that the Stovall doctrine-or the Linklet-

ter/Stovall doctrine-will apply in the future only to retroactivity petitions
89. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
90. 102 S. Ct. at 2581.
91. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
92. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court made explicit its
decision that the new rule applied only to fourth amendment decisions. United States v. Johnson,
102 S. Ct. at 2594.
93. 102 S. Ct. at 2587 (footnotes omitted).
94. Id (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969)).
95. Id. at 2594. It is not entirely clear from Justice Blackmun's opinion that he perceived a
distinction between making a decision retroactive "to all cases still pending on direct appeal," id.
at 2590, and making it retroactive "to all those cases which are still subject to direct review by this
Court." Id at 2586 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). See also id. at 2590 (retroactivity for "all nonfinal convictions"); id. at 2594 (retroactivity for
"all convictions that were not yet final"); id.at 2590 (retroactivity "to all cases pending on direct,
review"). The difference is important, for the application of retroactive benefits to all cases not yet
final encompasses litigation that has not yet reached the appellate level as well as appeals pending
when the law-changing decision was announced. Moreover, Justice Blackmun describes his new
rule as "consistent with" the civil doctrine of SchoonerPeggy, id. at 2583, but that doctrine seems
only to apply to cases that were at the appellate level when the law-changing decision came down,
an not to cases at some earlier stage of litigation. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text;
see also infra notes 251-65 and accompanying text.
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that were collateral attacks upon final convictions or direct appeals in which
the fourth amendment was not at issue. Inasmuch as Justice Blackmun acknowledged that many of the collateral matters will not reach federal courts
for failure to preserve issues with timely objections, 96 one result of Johnson is
a substantial limitation upon the three-factor doctrine as it has developed.
The majority also used Johnson as an occasion to submit a few words
regarding retroactivity in civil matters. Presumably, the comments were intended as clarification. Justice Blackmun wrote that "all questions of civil retroactivity continue to be governed by the standard enunciated in Chevron Oil
Co. v. Huson. " 97 Taken literally, that would mean the doctrine of Schooner
Peggy and other special analyses affecting certain civil cases 9s are destroyed.
It is possible, of course, that the Supreme Court intends exactly that result. It
may also be, however, that the Court simply seeks the more modest goal of
ensuring that the Chevron approach is differentiated from Linkletter/Stovall.
Two bits of evidence support the latter thesis. The first is that the Court
also cited Schooner Peggy approvingly, even to the point of suggesting that it
was a model for the rule enunciated in Johnson.99 Moreover, the Court spoke
of Chevron as distinct from Stovall because Chevron had a "clear break" prerequisite the Court could not find in Stovall or other analyses relevant to criminal matters. 1° Such evidence is admittedly far from dispositive. It is also
contradicted in some measure by the Court's use of Chevron in its very last
retroactivity decision of the 1981 term-a case that, prior to Johnson, would
arguably have called for application of one of the special retroactivity analyses.' 0 ' But that evidence, in turn, is undercut by the Court's additional citation, in that same case, to one of the additional retroactivity analyses
apparently outside the scope of Chevron.102
The last retroactivity case decided in June 1982 was Northern Poeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon PipeLine Co. 103 The Supreme Court held that
portions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978104 granting jurisdiction over certain
96. 102 S. Ct. at 2594 n.20.
97. Id. at 2594-95 (citations omitted). The Court also used Johnson to make three lesser
points. First, it suggested, if it did not say explicitly, that the reliance factor in some retroactivity
analyses could be satisfied by "a near-unanimous body of lower court authority", ld. at 2589 &
n.15 (footnote omitted), but perhaps not by a body of lower court authority that was less than
nearly unanimous. Second, the Court expressly rejected the notion that the logic of United States
v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), required nearly automatic prospectivity for fourth amendment
cases. 102 S. Ct. at 2592-93. Finally, the Court indicated that law-changing decisions substantially affecting the accuracy of fact-finding at trial would receive nearly automatic retroactivity
under the Linkletter/Stovall rule. Id. at 2594 n.21.
98. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text; infra notes 236-50, 266-85 and accompanying text.
99. 102 S. Ct. at 2583.
100. Id. at 2587 n.12.
101. See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
102. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2880 n.41
(1982) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (per curiam)). The approach in Buckley to
retroactivity is described infra note 115.
103. 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. V 1981).
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bankruptcy matters to non-Article III judges were unconstitutional. The
Court used a Chevron approach to determine the retroactivity of its holding:

It is plain that Congress' broad grant ofjudicial power to non-Art. III
bankruptcy judges presents an unprecedented question of interpretation of Art. III. It is equally plain that retroactive application would
not further the operation of our holding, and would surely visit substantial injustice and hardship upon those litigants who relied upon
the Act's vesting of jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts. We hold,

therefore, that our decision today shall apply only prospectively.10 5

The result seems reasonable enough. But the conclusion, and the rationale
upon which it is based-reliance upon Chevron in a jurisdictional matter--do

violence to the recently expressed intent of the Court that jurisdictional decisions will ipso facto apply retroactively. 106
As the foregoing chronology may indicate, the approach of the Supreme
Court to retroactivity at any one moment is difficult to predict. Any given

holding will at best clarify the present state of the law, or cast light upon past
developments. An assessment of the status of retroactivity analysis at the end

of the 1981 term, therefore, should be primarily a statement of what is, and
only a most guarded estimate of what may come.
Some directions nevertheless emerge. The first is that there is more than
one retroactivity analysis; in fact, there are several, with the precise number

unclear and possibly changing. The status of the analysis that has attracted
the most attention over the past two decades, the Linkletter/Stovall approach,

appears to be declining. That analysis, which was never a terribly reliable

predictor of future retroactivity decisions, 10 7 now seems restricted to two bod105. 102 S. Ct. at 2880 (footnote omitted).
106. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall, who wrote the majority
opinion in Risjord, voted with the majority in Northern Pipeline without comment. Separate from
the jurisdictional issue, one circuit believes that retroactivity was normally the rule for changes in
law occurring before bankruptcy adjudication became final. In re Spell, 650 F.2d 375, 377 (2d
Cir. 1981). Although that point of view is not necessarily inconsistent with the concern of the
Supreme Court about the impact of retroactivity for Northern Pipeline, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit also added the following comment: "It is noteworthy that this rule was applied
even though the result for the bankrupt was harsh." Id. But see Cle-Ware Indus. v. Sokolsky, 493
F.2d 863 (6th Cir.) (prospective application of new rule on attorney's fees in bankruptcy litigation), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 829 (1974).
107. See Vaccaro v. United States:
Perhaps no other area of Constitutional law is more enshrouded in puzzlement and apparent logical inconsistencies. . . . A catalogue of some of the. . . retroactivity holdings demonstrates the perplexities. For example, while the right to counsel at a
preliminary hearing where the defendant makes incriminating statements is retroactively
recognized, the right to counsel during accusatorial police interrogation during which the
accused makes incriminating statements is not retroactively enforced. Similarly, while
the defendant's right to a fair, impartial and unbiased jury is retroactively effected, the
right to an impartial judge may be given prospective application only. Likewise, the
defendant is entitled to retroactive protection against the extrajudicial confessions of a
co-defendant, but not of himself.
Systematic exclusion of Blacks from juries call for retroactive vindication, but systematic exclusion ofwomen apparently does not. Newly announced standards for determining the voluntariness of confessions are retroactive, but newly announced standards
for determining the voluntariness of guilty pleas are not.
461 F.2d 626, 628-29 (5th Cir. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
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ies of retroactivity issues--collateral attacks upon final convictions and direct
appeals outside the scope of the fourth amendment-and is besieged even in

the area of collateral attacks.
Moreover, the categories of cases outside the scope of Linkleller/Slovall

are more numerous and may be growing. Schooner Peggy has always been a
bulwark against Linkletter/Stovall expansion into civil cases pending on direct
appeal.10 8 Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co. 109 is similarly predominant
in diversity litigation. Johnson now prohibits the use of Linkleller/Stovall in
fourth amendment cases pending on direct appeal, and perhaps in all such
cases in which the conviction is not yet final.'10 Chevron, for now, is identified
as a distinct retroactivity analysis applicable at least to categories of civil cases
not claimed by Schooner Peggy or Vandenbark."II Law-changing decisions
restricting the jurisdiction of courts may 1 2 or may not 1 3 be subject to a special rule of automatic retroactivity. Even if they are not, there is no indication
that such cases would otherwise be placed under the frayed banner of Linklet4

ter/Stovall. Certain distinct bodies of law, "frequently" including tax law,"1
seem to be governed only by their own rules of retroactivity or prospectivity.11 5 Finally, in one of the two areas that Linkletter/Seovall still dominates
-criminal convictions under collateral attack-developing requirements for
the timely objections threaten to reduce to a residue the number of cases actu-

108. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 251-65 and accompanying text.
109. 311 U.S. 538 (1941). See infra notes 236-45 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 61-65, 103-06 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (commission appointments stricken because the process of appointment was unconstitutional), Concerning retroactivity:
[i]t is also our view that the Commission's inability to exercise certain powers because of
the method by which its members have been selected should not affect the validity of the
Commission's administrative actions and determinations to this date, including its administration of those provisions, upheld today, authorizing the public financing of federal elections. The past acts of the Commission are therefore accorded defacto validity,
just as we have recognized should be the case with respect to legislative acts performed
by legislators held to have been elected in accordance with an unconstitutional apportionment plan.
Id at 142 (citations omitted).
Note the absence of any reference to Linklefter/Sovall or Chevron, or any development of the
three factors to be considered under those analyses. See also Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 301
(1975) (making prospective a decision invalidating statutes restricting the electoral franchise for
city bond elections; prospectivity justified because it is necessary "to avoid the possibility of upsetting previous bond elections in the States"); NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347,
417 U.S. 1, 10 n.10 (1974) (when agency policy changes, court should remand so agency can make
determination on retroactivity); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (reaching the
same conclusion as Hill, 421 U.S. 289 (1975), with passing cite to Linkleffer, and justifyinp prospectivity on the ground of retroactivity's "substantial inequitable results"). Notwithstanding the
casual cite in Cipriano to Linkletter and the use of the "effect" factor of that analysis, both Ciprlano and Hill are actually part of an older line of decisions calling for prospectivity when the
process by which bonds are issued is stricken. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
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ally able to claim access to Linkletter/Stovall." 6 A relatively young doctrine
may already have seen its best days.
The importance of developments in the Supreme Court, of course, is determined to a significant degree by the extent to which Supreme Court rules
filter into the fabric of decision-making in the lower courts. It is within those
less sublime bodies, those "pawns, foot soldiers, worker bees of law," i7 that
the great mass of our litigation is finally resolved. It would be useful, therefore, to examine retroactivity decisions covering the past decade in the lower
federal courts. That body of information should help clarify the manner in
which Supreme Court rules have been construed, the areas in which lower
courts have struggled, and the reasons why lower courts experienced varying
degrees of success or failure. A reader would be well advised to keep in mind,
however, that the course of this examination may reveal as much about the
state of judicial administration as about retroactivity decisions over the last
decade. He may, in fact, discover that the efficient operation of a judicial system such as the United States enjoys depends as much upon careful supervision and administration of lower courts as it does upon development of wellreasoned doctrine.
The organization of the inquiry will proceed as follows: the application
of the more complex doctrines .ofLinkletter/Stovall and Chevron will be examined first, particularly with a view to exploring the manner in which the
substrata of those analyses operate together; cases involving other, more specialized retroactivity doctrines will next be discussed.
II.

A.

RETROACTIVITY AND THE LOWER COURTS

Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron
1. The Requirement of Novelty

It would seem to be implicit in the Linkletter/Stovall doctrine that the
possibility of prospective application of a law-changing decision can arise only
when the rule at issue is in some meaningful sense a new rule." 18 This notion,
implicit in Linkletter/Stovall, was articulated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, in

which the Supreme Court held that prospectivity was a possible result only in
116. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
117. L. FRIEDMAN, A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 11 (1973).
118. Justice Clark's opinion in Linkletter makes it clear that the Court considered its rule in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the prospectivity of which was at issue inLinkletter, to be new
law. Justice Clark noted, "Although M.afpp may not be considered to be an overruling decision in
the sense that it did not disturb [an] earlier holding... its effect certainly was to change law with
regard to enforcement ofthe right." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 619 n.l (1965); cf.United
States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2587 (1982):
when a decision of this Court merely has applied settled precedents to new and different
factual situations, no real question has arisen as to whether the later decision should
apply retrospectively. In such cases, it has been a foregone conclusion that the rule of

the later case applies in earlier cases, because the later decision has not in fact altered
that rule in any material way.
There was a time when novelty seemed no longer required in one category of cases, but the requirement was reinstated recently. See infra notes 286-301 and accompanying text.
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cases in which a court first established that the decision at issue decided "a
new principle of law" or addressed "an issue of first impression."119 Even if
Chevron had not been so explicit, however, it is fundamental that the rule
whose retroactivity is at issue be a newly announced rule, for if it is not new,
its application to pending or future cases would seem in no sense to fall under

a retroactivity analysis. 120 It is at least arguable, therefore, that novelty has
always been required before a court may undertake consideration of either the

Linkletter/Stovall or Chevron analysis.
For the most part, the lower courts have accepted the logic of the novelty
requirement. The circuit courts, in fact, have been emphatic in demanding
novelty as a prerequisite to retroactivity analysis in both civil and criminal
matters.' 2 1 Even on this basic point, however, there are mavericks, some of
whom may be found in the same circuits whose published opinions rely heavily upon the element of novelty. In Jenkins v. UnitedStates Civil Service Com119. 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).
120. See United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2587 (1982).
121. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (before prospectivity may be considered, there must first be an expansion of the exclusionary rule, not merely
a restatement or application of an existing rule), rev'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982);
NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 757 (7th Cir. 1981) ("in the instant case, the
matter seems settled for us because [interalia] the new rule was not an unforeshadowed departure
from the Board's previously existing practice"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1982); Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1980) (nonretroactivity not applicable because
decision was foreshadowed in Second Circuit), af'd, 102 S.Ct. 1883 (1982); Valencia v. Anderson
Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1279 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Having decided that our ruling in this case
establishes no new principle of law, it is unnecessary to address the remaining prongs of the Chewron Oil test"), rev'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (1981); Everson v. McLouth Steel Corp., 586
F.2d 6, 8 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("Everson contends that our decision in Guy should not be
retroactively applied. He relies on Chevron Oil Co ... In our opinion Chevron Oil is inapposite.
In Guy we applied our ruling retroactively. We did not overturn previously established law");
United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1173 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) ("we are convinced that
Chadwick presents no question of retroactivity because, as we have previously held, we do not
regard Chadwick as representing a departure from the Supreme Court's long-standing approach to
the Fourth Amendment"); Bunker v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1977) (retroactivity analysis
unnecessary if operative case does not overrule clear past precedent or disrupt long accepted practice); United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (no retroactivity because
"decision announced no new rule of law; it did not represent any 'sharp break in the web of the
law' "), cert. deniedsub nom. Robles v. United States, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977); Ferguson v. United
States, 513 F.2d 1011, 1013 (2d Cir. 1975) (operative case foreshadowed by two Second Circuit
cases; operative case therefore lacked the novelty necessary for a consideration of prospectivity);
Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1294 (7th Cir. 1975) (no prospectivity analysis because operative case is not sufficiently new), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); United States v.
Karp, 508 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 1974) ("the threshold question bearing upon the issue of
prospective application of a rule under Linkletter v. Walker . . .is whether the decision states
new principles of law or merely applies what has always been the law") cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007
(1975); Mayer v. Moeykens, 494 F.2d 855, 857 (2d Cir. 1974), (operative case did not decide a
sufficiently novel principle, so it is retroactively applied without consideration of other elements of
retroactivity analysis), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 926 (1974); Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 996 (7th
Cir. 1973) ("new principle of law" factor is primary; "[o]nly if that test is satisfied, do we reach the
second and third prongs"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
In Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit took the novelty requirement a step further. The
court held that the operative decision was "a clear departure from established law when applied to
informal rulemaking proceedings," and therefore concluded that it should operate prospectively,
without further discussion of the other factors in a Chevron retroactivity analysis. Id. at 474.
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a district court in the District of Columbia concluded that the
decision at issue established no new principle of law. Nevertheless, the court
went on to make an analysis of how the other prongs of Chevron would weigh
in a retroactivity analysis. 23 In like manner the Eastern District of New York
reported in Novak v. Harris that "the decision reached in Goldfarb inevitably
followed from the precedent established by Frontiero and Wiesenfeld,"' 24 but
the court still felt obligated to examine the factors of "purpose" and "equity"
before concluding that the operative decision- Goldfarb-shouldbe applied

retroactively. 125
Although those cases may be at odds with both the logic of Linklettei/Stovall and Chevron, as well as with the precedents established in most of
the circuits,' 26 the deviation may have been beneficial and was almost certainly harmless. Courts are, after all, often inclined to provide alternate foundations upon which their decisions can rest by engaging in the potentially
useful but technically extraneous discussions we term dicta. As long as such
supplementary material does not contradict reasoning central to the case at
bar-and there was no contradiction in the results of Jenkins and Novak-the
apparent digressions do not constitute cause for alarm.
More troubling, however, is the decision in Gunter v. Merchants Warren
National Bank. 127 Litigation began when the bank sued in state court for
money owed and at the same time attached defendants' real estate under state
rules permitting attachment in an ex parte proceeding. Defendants in the state
suit responded by bringing action in federal court for damages and equitable
relief, arguing that the preexisting rule ofFuentes v. Shevin,128 which prohibits
ex parte replevin of personalty, was applicable to real estate as well. The court
agreed that Fuentes could be extended to include attatchments of real estate.
Moreover, because the court also reported that "we do not regard Fuentes as
departing from established principles of procedural due process," 129 a conclusion that Gunter would apply retroactively would seem to have followed. In
fact, however, the court reached almost the exactly opposite result. Refusing
to give Fuentes "solely prospective effect," the court compromised:
122. 460 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1978).
123. Id. at 613.

124. 504 F. Supp. 101, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), struck
down dependency requirements for widowers' (but not widows') Social Security benefits as violating the fifth amendment right to equal protection. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975),
held that a statutory grant of survivors' benefits to widows and a denial of such benefits to widowers violated the same constitutional right. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), held that
a requirement that dependency be established before spouses of female military personnel were
eligible for certain benefits, in the absence of a similar requirement for spouses of male military
personnel, also violated the equal protection element of the fifth amendment due process clause.
,125. 504 F. Supp. at 106-07; accord Cash v. Califano, 469 F. Supp. 129, 132-35 (W.D. Va.
1979), afl'd, 621 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 447 F. Supp. 192, 196-99 (E.D.
Pa. 1978), mod#fed on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913
(1981).
126. See supra note 121.
127. 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973) (three-judge court).

128. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
129. 360 F. Supp. at 1091 n.17.
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Since a retrospective judgment would cast doubt on the validity of all
real estate attachments in actions now pending in the Maine courts
and would create a cloud on the title to any property hitherto sold

pursuant to a real estate attachment, our decree will be prospective
only and will have no effect on any attachments, other than the two

attachments presently before us, which have been made prior to the

130
date of this opinion.

The need for novelty was cast aside because it led to retroactivity, and retroactivity led to consequences the court was unwilling to accept. 131 In essence, the
effect factor identified as part of retroactivity analysis in Linklel/er and Chevron was decisive, eclipsing any other considerations within or without the Linkletter/Chevron standard. That result was unusual not only for its apparent
logical flaw in disregarding the absence of novelty, but also because among the
Linkletter/Chevron factors, effect is not always predominant.
2. Priority Among the Factors
Most lower federal courts have attempted to follow the wavering command of the Supreme Court that the purpose factor set out in Link/etter/Stovall and Chevron be accorded primacy 132 in those approaches to
retroactivity analysis. 33 Moreover, and also consistent with Supreme Court
instruction, 134 the purpose factor usually receives greater deference when the

newly announced rule is intended to enhance the accuracy of fact-finding at
trial. 135 The importance the lower courts have accorded to accurate fact-find130.

Id. at 1091.
131. It should be mentioned that the Gunter decision applied to the parties before the court
because the judges were concerned about the possibility that a purely prospective holding would
strip litigants of their incentive to change the law and might otherwise fall short of the "case or
controversy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution, which is now disregarded in retroactivity matters. See supra note 34.
132. The primacy of the purpose factor was recently restated in Hankerson v. North Carolina,
432 U.S. 233, 241 (1977). Cf. United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2594 n.21 (1982).
133. See, eg., Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir. 1981) (purpose factor "clearly the
most important"); United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1980) (other factors important "only when the purpose of the rule in question [does] not clearly favor either retroactivity or
prospectivity"); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975) (purpose is primary factor),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Brown v. United States, 508 F.2d 618, 625 (3d Cir. 1974) (same),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975); United States v. Grant, 489 F.2d 27, 32 (8th Cir. 1973) (same).
But see NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 757 (7th Cir.) ("Since there is a presumption favoring retroactivity, all three Chevron factors must support prospective application in order
to limit the retroactive effect of the decision"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
134. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 241 (1977).
135. See, e.g., White v. Maggio, 556 F.2d 1352, 1355 (5th Cir. 1977) (retroactivity generally
appropriate when purpose of new rule is to correct serious flaw in factfinding at trial); Harris v.
Israel, 515 F. Supp. 568, 572 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (when purpose is determination of truth, that consideration will outweigh reliance and affect administration of justice); Owens v. United States, 383
F. Supp. 780, 786 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (same), af'd, 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996
(1975). The lower courts have also tried to follow the rule of the Supreme Court that when truthfinding is not "substantially" affected, Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 243 (1977), the
purpose factor will not weigh so heavily in favor of retroactivity. In United States v. O'Shea, 479
F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1973), Judge Coffin commented that while a particular rule was both "salutary
and important" and went to the accuracy of sentencing procedures based on presentence reports,
the court was obligated to weigh probabilities to determine whether erroneous reports were lkely
to have affected prison sentences significantly. Id. at 314. Accord Basset v. Smith, 464 F.2d 347,
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ing becomes most obvious in cases in which fact-finding was held not to be a
substantial purpose of a new rule. In Martin v. Wyrick, 136 for example, a state
convict sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that he had been denied the
right to represent himself, a right the Supreme Court subsequently recognized
as constitutionally based. 137 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit introduced its retroactivity analysis by agreeing that purpose "is the paramount
consideration."' 38 But then, having concluded that the purpose of the rule at
issue did not go substantially to fact-finding, the panel reasoned that the absence of an important fact-finding purpose behind the change in law "strongly
suggests the rule should not be made retroactive."' 139 Similarly, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that when a new rule of criminal procedure
does not affect the determination of truth at trial, it should be applied only
prospectively. 140
Such cases are representative of the determination by the lower courts to
follow faithfully the lead of the Supreme Court in establishing the priority of
the purpose factor, but on this point there has also been considerable confusion and backsliding. A district court in California, ruling upon a federal convict's petition to vacate his sentence under a change of law promulgated by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reasoned that the reliance factor was
"of utmost importance" and justified that position by citing the Supreme
Court's view of its own power in the area of retroactivity: "Of course, overriding all of the specific criteria which govern the Court in this determination is
the general rule that 'the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule
prospective. . . where the exigencies of the situation require such an application.' Linkletter v. Walker,. . . 381 U.S. at 628.'

14 1

Another district court, in

Pennsylvania, reached the conclusion that "[tihis test [Chevron's] is all inclusive; each aspect must be met."' 4 2
Such inconsistency in the district courts is not surprising, because all the
circuits are not certain that the purpose factor is primary. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in fact, has twice concluded that the
349 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[T]he [Supreme] Court has recognized that 'the extent to which a condemned
ractice infects the integrity of the truth-determining process at trial is a question of probabilities.'
tovall v. Deino, 388 US. 293, 298"), cer. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
136. 568 F.2d 583 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 435 U.S. 975 (1978).

137. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
138. 568 F.2d at 587.
139. Id
140. See United States ex rel Cannon v. Johnson, 536 F.2d 1013, 1016-17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 928 (1976); accord United States v. Powell, 449 F. Supp. 562, 564 (E.D. Pa. 1978)

(new constitutional rules the purpose of which is not to improve accuracy of factfinding receive

prospective treatment).
141. Alaway v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 978, 982 (C.D. Cal. 1972). In fact, however, the
passage this court cited in Linkletter did not stand so much for freedom to choose among the
factors as for the view of the Supreme Court that while the Court had routinely permitted cases to
be applied retroactively in the past, it was not bound to do so. Moreover, one commentator believes the Supreme Court has identified reliance as the least important factor in the Linkletter
analysis. Blumenfeld, Retroactivity after O'Callahan: An Analytical and StatisticalApproach, 60
GEO. L.J. 551, 571 (1972).
142. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1357 v. Leonard, 450 F. Supp. 663, 666 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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purpose factor is secondary to reliance. NationalAssociation of Broadcasters
v. FCC143 was a suit to force a refund of certain fees paid to an agency. Plaintiffs and others had previously challenged the fee schedule of the agency in the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but had lost in that court. 144 Some of
those plaintiffs took the case to the Supreme Court and won, but the parties in
the instant case-who were from different segments of the communications
industry-had not pursued the case on appeal. Normally that lapse would
have precluded plaintiffs in the case at bar from any relief, but the case was
unusual because the agency had agreed, when litigating before the Fifth Circuit, that fees paid pending a judicial decision would be refunded in full if the
litigation before the Fifth Circuit were decided against the agency. When the
plaintiffs in the case at bar sued for refunds, however, the agency resisted repayment by calling for prospectivity of the Supreme Court decision on the
ground that an agency should be able to rely upon its own rules.145 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was sympathetic to the reasoning advanced by the agency, and commented that "[b]y far the most important
consideration of the four [factors] 146 is the extent of justifiable reliance on the
old rule."' 47 Because the agency was unable to demonstrate that it had in fact
relied upon its old rule, the court decided in favor of retroactivity. 148 It does
seem clear, however, that the court's elevation of reliance to first priority made
the case a closer decision than it might otherwise have been.
NationalAssociation of Broadcasters is arguably skewed by the agency's
apparent attempt to avoid its earlier promise to refund, but the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
N.A. v. National Student Marketing Corp. 149 contained no such distorting
facts. Wachovia involved a suit under the federal securities laws'5 0 and turned
upon a determination of which of two statutes of limitations would be applied.
The court had recently adopted the shorter of the two limitations, but at the
time the cause of action arose and the suit was filed, the longer limitation had
been in use. Citing Chevron as the guideline for its retroactivity analysis, the
143. 554 F.2d 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
144. Clay Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 464 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1972).
145. 554 F.2d at 1131.
146. The court cited "the commentators" for the proposition that there were four factors to
consider, including reliance and purpose. The other two factors identified were "the degree of
finality of plaintiffs transaction" and "the element of surprise." Id. at 1132. Presumably the
degree of finality factor is drawn from the effect factor the Supreme Court articulated in Sto vall,
see supra note 11 and accompanying text, but the concept might not take into account all that has
been included in consideration of effect. See infra notes 206-15 and accompanying text. The

element of surprise factor appears to be little more than mere surplus, as the concept would seem
to be included in the notion of "reliance."
147. 554 F.2d at 1132.

148. "[The Fifth Circuit case] was a case of first impression, and since the FCC had notice
almost from the time it adopted the schedule that it would be subject to challenge in court, there
could be no justifiable reliance here; and indeed, the record demonstrates that there was none."

Id
149. 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
150. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); Securities Act of 1933
§ 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
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court held that the reliance factor was "the first, and most fundamental factor,"1 51 and that the plaintiffs were entitled to rely upon the law as it stood
when they filed their suit. To clinch the decision, the court concluded that
even if the purpose factor "suggests retroactive application . . . we think it
outweighed by the first and third criteria, which overwhelmingly dictate that
the decision be applied prospectively here."' 52 Somewhat more tersely, the
same conclusion: "The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the
53
first factor for consideration [reliance] is decisive."'
Puzzling as such language may be, the apparently casual words of both
circuits contain a clue that may explain how the two courts departed from the
path marked by the Supreme Court-if indeed they actually departed therefrom. Both the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and District of Columbia
Circuits referred to reliance as the "first" factor in the established retroactivity
analysis. In fact, reliance was listed in the earliest days of Linkletter/Stovall
decisions as the second factor, and purpose was listed first.' 54 When the
Supreme Court decided Chevron, however, it inverted the order of the two
factors, placing reliance first. At the same time, the Court mixed the reliance
factor into the explicit language that established the novelty prerequisite,
which had been only implicit in Linkletter.' 55 Thus it happened that reliance
was mixed with an element arguably more fundamental than any of the single
factors-perhaps with the result of heightening its importance in the analyses
of some courts diligently attempting to follow the lead of the Supreme Court.
It is sobering to consider that on such happenstance, rules of law may turn.
3.

The Sources of Purpose

Question of priority among the Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron factors
aside, it is settled that a lower court making a determination of retroactivity
must search for the purpose of the new rule and the impact retroactivity would
have upon that purpose.156 That directive is straightforward, even if it clearly
leaves wide latitude to argue about the true purpose of any particular rule.
Lower courts, therefore, have typically been able to examine the purpose of a
new rule without becoming enmeshed in controversy about the scope or direc151. 650 F.2d at 347. Cf. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172, 1180 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
cited a criminal case from the Linkietter line for the proposition that fairness is a factor to be
weighed only when the purpose of the rule in question does not clearly favor prospectivity or
retroactivity. Although Judge Robinson sat on the panels of both Wachovia, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) and Zweibon, there is no mention of Zweibon in the later decision.
152. 650 F.2d at 348.
153. Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1294 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.

943 (1976).
154. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
155. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) ("First, the decision to be applied
nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent
on which litigants may have relied. . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed").
156. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07; Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. See also Hankerson v. North
Carolina, 233, 432 U.S. 241-43 (1977).
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tion of their inquiry. An absence of controversy, however, does not preclude
the possibility that a court has searched too far or in the wrong direction. The
circumstance under which such misdirection may occur arises when a lawchanging judicial decision affects a statute, either by changing its interpretation or by striking some portion of the statute as unconstitutional. In that
situation courts are inclined to look beyond the purpose of the law-changing
decision and to the purpose of the underlying statute. Whether such an investigation is authorized is unclear. Linkletter spoke of "weigh[ing] the merits
and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect."' 57 The Court did not consider what constituted
"prior history" of the rule, for in Linkletter it was common knowledge that the
exclusionary rule had a long history that was clearly relevant to the retroactivity analysis. Chevron, by contrast, spoke only of the purpose of the new
rule.

158

Whether or not an expansive approach to examining the purpose factor is
in fact authorized, it undeniably may affect the outcome of retroactivity analysis. Often the effect will be beneficial. In Travis v. Trust Company Bank, t59 for
example, plaintiff had sued under the Federal Truth in Lending Act,' 60 and
alleged that defendant had failed to disclose the assignment of a security interest as required by legislation. Initially, the pivotal question was whether the
item assigned was a security interest. While the case was pending at trial,
however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in a separate case
that the item at issue was indeed a security interest.161 The focus of Travis
therefore became the retroactivity of the intervening decision.
When the Fifth Circuit made its retroactivity analysis under Chevron, it
examined the purpose of the federal legislation, not the intervening decision.
The purpose of the statute in Travis, the panel explained, included an attempt
to deter sharp lending practices and generally to ensure that lenders did not
take unfair advantage of debtors. Moreover, the court noted, exceptions to the
lender's disclosure obligations were to be strictly construed. The court therefore concluded that the purpose factor of the Chevron analysis weighed in
favor of retroactivity, and decided in favor of retroactive application. 162
While Travis may demonstrate how readily the purpose factor may lead a
court to debatable conclusions, 163 it also shows how an examination of the
purpose of a statute relevant to the law-changing decision may be helpful to
157. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. United States v. Johnson makes reference only to the purpose
of the new rule. 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2594 n.21 (1982).

158. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 107-08.
159.
160.
161.
162.

621 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1980).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691(0 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Elzea v. National Bank, 570 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1978).
621 F.2d at 150-51.

163. One might wonder, for example, why this civil case might not be a suitable subject for the
application of the then-popular principle that when deterrence is an intended purpose, prospectivity is appropriate more often than not. Cf. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1975).
Moreover, the reference by the court to its obligation to construe strictly exceptions to the Truth in

Lending Act would seem more relevant to the scope of the statute than to the "purpose" factor of
a retroactivity analysis.
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retroactivity analysis. For if the panel deciding Travis had looked only to the
purpose of the law-changing decision itself, successful analysis might have
been frustrated: the relevant portion of the law-changing decision turned
wholly on that court's view of the language of the statute and a related regulation, without consideration of any policy that might have been considered a
purpose under the Chevron doctrine. 164 Without examining the underlying
statute, therefore, the court might have been unable to single out any purpose,
a result that would have made an important part of the retroactivity analysis a
65
sterile exercise.'
Other decisions suggest that examinations of the purpose of something
other than the law-changing decision may at times be less benign. In Crumpler
v. Califano,166 for example, the plaintiff sought retroactivity for a Supreme
Court decision striking as unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security
Act providing benefits to surviving widows with children, but not to similarly
situated widowers. 167 The statute violated the fifth amendment right to equal
protection, the Supreme Court concluded, because by refusing to provide
equal benefits to widowers, who might then be able to remain at home and
care for their children, the provision reduced incentives and protections for
168
women who might want to enter the workforce.
Deciding in favor of retroactivity for that Supreme Court decision, the
federal district court in Crumpler looked to the purpose of the Social Security
Act. The legislation, the court concluded, was intended to make possible
closer supervision of children in certain one-parent families, and retroactivity
would serve that purpose. 169 Lost in the analysis was the question how the
purpose of the fifth amendment-the real basis for the decision of the
Supreme Court-would be served by retroactivity. It may have been that the
result in Crumpler would have been the same had the court examined the purpose of the fifth amendment as the Supreme Court had presented it, but that
result is far from certain. What seems clearer is that the lack of a better defined boundary for investigations of the purpose factor has left the lower
courts in some disarray, a situation that created the possibility of glaringly
different results-or, even less desirable, results based upon the use of whichever source of purpose suits the predisposition of a particular judge in a partic164. See Elzea v. National Bank, 570 F.2d 1248, 1249-50 (5th Cir. 1978).
165. Two other cases involving the Truth in Lending Act also used the purpose of the statute,
rather than of the law-changing decision, for their retroactivity analysis. Valencia v. Anderson
Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1290 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (1981);
Brown v. Termplan, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 160, 162-63 (N.D. Ga. 1978). Another decision in which an
examination of the underlying statute seemed to be beneficial was United States v. LePatourel,
593 F.2d 827, 831-32 (8th Cir. 1979)'(statute of limitations for Federal Tort Claims Act). See also
Rudolph v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 586 F.2d 90, 94 (8th Cir. 1978) (examination of purpose of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 led to result that examination of law-changing decision would arguably have

reached), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 924 (1979); Krilich v. United States, 502 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir.
1974) (examination of underlying policy of res judicata), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
166. 443 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Va. 1978).
167. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
168. Id. at 645.
169. 443 F. Supp. at 345-46.
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170
ular case.
170. The only Social Security Act case identified in the course of this survey that lays heavier
emphasis upon the law-changing decision than upon the statute is Cash v. Califano, 469 F. Supp.
129 (W.D. Va. 1979), afl'd, 621 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1980). The court observed, "In any case,
retroactive application would serve the purpose of replacement of pecuniary advantage as contemplated by the statute. More importantly, retroactive application would best serve the Goldfarb
purpose of according 'equal value' to past contributions of female wage earners." Id. at 134.
Affirming that decision, Judge Haynsworth demonstrated similar insight into the distinction between the purpose of the judicial decision and the purpose of the statute:
The rule at issue here is the equal protection of female wage earners. Unlike the situation in Linkletter, where the rule was designed to implement a policy, here the rule and
the policy are one. Retroactivity would simply insure that money paid into Social Security by a female wage earner would be available to her surviving spouse on the same
terms as money earned and paid by a male wage earner is available to his spouse. The
time of protection is expanded. In fact, like the situation presented in CathedralAcademy, nonretroactivity would retard application of the rule by permitting the Secretary to
continue to violate constitutional rights mandated by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
626 F.2d at 631. More typical of retroactivity decisions involving portions of the Social Security
Act are Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975) (purpose of statute was to support
dependents, who need to have other sources of funds replenished), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976); Novak v. Harris, 504 F. Supp. 101, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1980):
The court finds that retroactivity would promote the legislative intent behind enactment
of [the statute] and the purpose of [the law-changing decision]. Specifically, it would
further the goal that funds paid into Social Security by a female wage earner should be
available to her surviving spouse on the same terms as money earned and paid by a male
wage earner.
See also Aznavorian v. Califano, 440 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (purpose of Social Security
Act is to benefit needy people), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 170 (1978). Jenkins v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 460 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1978), took the same approach when examining the retroactivity of judicial decisions related to the Civil Service Survivor Annuities Act, 5
U.S.C. § 8341(a)(3)(A)(ii) (1976): "[Retroactivity] will further the purposes of the survivor annuity law by giving support to dependents and by extending 'benefits to surviving memebers of the
Id. at 613 (quoting Gentry
immediate family of the annuitant, without regard to dependency.'
v. United States, 546 F.2d 343, 353 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
In all those cases the choice of purposes to be examined by each individual court may have
been harmless to the result, or even beneficiaL In other cases, however, an examination of the
purpose of the statute may have led the court away from a diverging purpose behind the lawchanging decision. See Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35, 41 (E.D. Va. 1976), af'd,
579 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978) (interpretation of statute of limitations for Title VII of 1964 Civil
Rights Act not retroactive, partly because "Title VII evinces a strong policy in favor of airing
employment discrimination grievances"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); Hines v. Olinkraft,
Inc., 413 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (W.D. La. 1976) (purpose factor may support prospectivity because
retroactivity of interpretation of statute of limitations "would not further the broad remedial policies of § 1981"). Such use of the purpose behind statues, rather than the often narrow purpose
behind a judicial decision affecting portions of a statute, suggest that decisions relating to enactments such as Title VII or § 1981 would almost never be retroactive.
Even more obvious cases demonstrate how easily a court can err when it strays too far from
the purpose of the law-changing decision. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. FEA, 463 F. Supp. 1079 (N.D.
Cal. 1979), involved a suit by a company to force an agency to modify an order the agency had
issued. The order, which would have forced the company to make repayments to a gasoline station operator for overcharges on rent, was issued under the authority of the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which gave the agency such authority to control oil-related prices as existed pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1904 (1976). Subsequent to the order of the agency, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals held that once the Economic Stabilization Act had expired, the agency had no authority to
issue the type of order in dispute in the instant case. Shell Oil Co. v. FEA, 527 F.2d 1243 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1975). Because the Economic Stabilization Act had expired before the agency
issued the order, the agency sought prospectivity for Shell Oil. Arguably the law-changing case
should have been treated as a matter ofjurisdiction, which might have received automatic retroactivity, see infra notes 266-85 and accompanying text, but instead the court made a Chevron analysis. Reasoning that a purpose of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act was to preserve the
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4. Bases for Reliance

Of the three factors characteristic of both the Linkletter/Sto vall and Chevron analyses, the one that perhaps stirs the greatest empathy is reliance. Prejudicing someone who relied upon existing rules through retroactive
application of a change in those rules simply seems unfair, so it should come
as no surprise that reliance has a lengthy history as a factor supporting prospective application of a new rule.17 1 There must, of course, have been actual
reliance before the factor can weigh in favor of prospectivity. Federal courts
have treated as fundamental the notion that a party seeking relief from retroactivity must demonstrate that he actually depended upon the existing state of
the law-that he took some action, or refrained from taking some action, in
compliance with what he believed the law to be at the time he acted. In Of
Course, Inc. v. Commissioner,172 a corporate taxpayer was unable to resist retroactivity for an unfavorable new rule when it was "plain that the taxpayer
was not influenced in any action taken by [the old rule]. Its decision to liquidate and the procedure followed would have been the same whether [the old
rule] prevailed or not."'173 Similarly, inAiello v. City of Wilmington, 174 a mu-

nicipality argued against retroactivity for a law-changing decision on the
ground that the new law, subjecting cities to legal as well as equitable remedies

for civil rights violations, was a dramatic departure from precedent. The court
rejected the argument, partly because the city was unable to show that "the
earlier decision established a rule of substantive conduct on which the municicompetitive viability of small operators in various segments of the petroleum industry, the court
held that retroactive application of Shell Oil would not serve that purpose. 463 F. Supp. at 1083.
What the court ignored was that once the Economic Stabilization Act had expired, the Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act simply had no bearing on the issue of rents. In essence, the court had
referred to the purpose of a statute which was, in the very nature of the law-changing decision,
utterly irrelevant to the retroactivity analysis.
An analogue to the Atlantic Richfield decision is Bush v. Wood Bros. Transfer, Inc., 398 F.
Supp. 1030 (S.D. Tex. 1975), in which a district court looked not to the purpose of the statute at
issue, but to the purpose of the old, now overturned, case law that had construed the statute:
The second criterion concerns the nature and operation of the past rule that is in question. The rule here was that during the pendency of an EEOC investigation, the § 1981
statute of limitations is tolled. The purpose of this rule was to implement the policy of
encouraging plaintiffs to use every avenue of relief prior to instituting a civil suit. In
Johnson, the Supreme Court has apparently come to the realization that the theory of
the old rule does not operate in practice, however, [sic] there are presently numerous
litigants who relied on the rule and refrained from instituting theoretically premature
§ 1981 actions prior to the conclusion of an EEOC proceeding. Thus, it is the opinion of
this Court that the second criterion is also met inasmuch as the prior rule is presently in
operation in the form of pending Title VII and § 1981 litigation and nonjudicial EEOC
proceedings. The rule served a positive function which would be destroyed by the retroactive application of Johnson.
Id. at 1032-33. The melange of reliance and purpose aside, the court simply failed to comprehend
how far afield it had gone-perhaps in part because the path was so poorly marked.
171. Even before Linkletter, reliance upon an established rule, or the possibility of unfair surprise, was identified as a factor that should operate in favor of prospective application of a new
rule. See Note, Prospective Overrulingand RetroactiveApplication in the FederalCourts, 71 Yale
.J. 907, 944-50 (1962), and cases cited therein.
172. 499 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
173. Id. at 759-60.
174. 470 F. Supp. 414 (D. Del. 1979), aft'd, 623 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1980).
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pality relied."' 17 5
At first glance it might seem that actual reliance should also incorporate
the notion of good-faith reliance-that is, the sort of reasonable conduct citizens should be able to expect from one another. In fact, however, the Supreme
Court has not always insisted upon that requirement. Particularly in the area
of search and seizure, evidence obtained through unlawful conduct by law
enforcement authorities has routinely escaped retroactive application of the
exclusionary rule, because the police acted in reliance upon the nonapplicability of that rule. Any other approach would have reversed the result in Link/etler itself, making that decision retroactive. Justice Rehnquist may have best
explained the reason for the absence of a good-faith requirement in search and
seizure cases when he noted that "although the police in [two retroactivity
cases involving unlawful searches] could not have been expected to foresee the
application of the exclusionary rule to state criminal trials, they could reasonably have76 entertained no similar doubts as to the illegality of their
conduct."1

Lower federal courts have followed the lead of the Supreme Court in
search and seizure cases, 177 but in other areas an absence of good faith seems
to count heavily against a plea for prospectivity. In McKinnon v. Patterson,178
for example, convicts brought a civil rights action against prison officials for
punishing the convicts without a sufficient hearing. The cause of action rested
upon an appellate court opinion subsequently overruled by Supreme Court
t decisions, putting the prisoners in the anomalous position- for convicts 79
of pleading for nonretroactivity for a law-changing decision. Both plaintiffs
and defendants apparently believed that their respective sides of the case met
the relevant tests of the old rule, but it was to the convicts that the judge directed a telling remark: "Plaintiffs rely upon the prior case law to obtain redress for past actions taken against them; plaintiffs do not allege that their
own actions were authorized by the prior law."' 8 0
175. Id. at 418. Accord In re Spell, 650 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1981) (neither party able to demonstrate reliance on old rule); United States v. Marshall, 471 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(Bazelon, CJ., dissenting)(no prospectivity when prosecution did not rely upon old rule).
176. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538 (1975).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975)); United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236 (6th Cir.), cert. deniedsub
nom. Kaye v. United States, 444 U.S. 991 (1979) (same).
178. 425 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), modfiedon othergrounds, 568 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978).
179. Criminal defendants are constitutionally protected against ietroactive application of lawchanging decisions adverse to the defendants' interests. See supra note 20. Normally, therefore,

criminal defendants and convicts raise retroactivity issues by pleading for retroactive application
of decisions favorable to them.
180. 425 F. Supp. at 388. See also Brown v. Termplan, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1978),

in which a lender failed to make certain disclosures in the belief that the law did not oblige him to
do so. Subsequently the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that such disclosure must be
made, Elzea v. National Bank, 570 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1978), and the issue was the retroactivity of
that holding. Refusing the lender's plea for prospectivity, the court commented, "A creditor
should evaluate its credit terms so as to come within the spirit of the law as well as its letter.
Otherwise, as here, the creditor may find himself outside of both." 459 F. Supp. at 163 (footnote

omitted). Courts also seem to require that good faith continue for the entire period during which a
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The issue of good faith aside, parties have shown impressive imagination
in proposing variations upon which the reliance factor could rest. With vary-

ing degrees of success, they have offered prior judicial decisions, legislation,
regulations, industry practice, and even the absence of standards by which

conduct could be measured as foundations for reliance. As might be expected,
reliance upon case law seems to have worked best.

Parties may choose the safest ground of all when citing prior Supreme

Court decisions. 18 1 The lower courts are also inclined to consider favorably

reliance based upon lesser judicial decisions,' 8 2 an approach the Supreme

Court has recently sanctioned. 18 3 The Supreme Court, however, seems to

countenance a substantial body of decisions, preferably from the federal courts
of appeals, in which "virtual unanimity" was achieved, 184 while the lower

courts for many years have been content with considerably less persuasive precedent. In an appropriate circumstance, a lower court has let a single federal

case serve as sufficient foundation for reliance, 185 and state decisons have also

satisfied the requirement.' 8 6 The lower courts are divided upon the appropriateness of reliance based upon authority subject to significant judicial dispute,
or even scholarly criticism,' 8 7 but it seems settled that reliance cannot be
party relied. See Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064, 1073-74 (2d Cir. 1977) (no
good faith reliance when a party's actions, arguably in good faith at one time, were later conditioned more by inertia than good faith).
181. See Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 156 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Whether [a 1950
Supreme Court case] was 'clear past precedent' to the Supreme Court in 1971, the unqualified
pronouncement in that case undoubtedly made the doctrine clear enough to parties relying upon it
from 1950 to 1971."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973).
182. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (reliance upon circuit court decisions), cert. denied,452 U.S. 954 (1981); Brown v.
Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Walker, 569 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.
1978) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978); Williams v. Phil Rich Fan Mfg. Co., 552 F.2d 596
(5th Cir. 1977) (same); Krilich v. United States, 502 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 992 (1975).
183. See United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2589 n.15 (1982). See also supra note 87.
184. See United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2589 n.15 (1982).
185. United States v. Dorszynski, 524 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977
(1976) (prior decision in District of Columbia Circuit was only appellate authority on point at time
of reliance).
186. See Martin v. Wyrick, 568 F.2d 583 (8th Cir.) (reliance upon line of state court decisions),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 975 (1978). In Litwhiler v. Hidlay, 429 F. Supp. 984 (M.D. Pa. 1977), the
court noted, "The fact that three dissenters in [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case upholding
patronage firings] argued for a position similar to the one which ultimately prevailed [in the lawchanging United States Supreme Court case], does not render the Defendants' reliance on the
majority view of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonable." Id. at 986.
187. See, e.g., Aufiero v. Clarke, 639 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.) (valid reliance upon "nearly unanimous" prior case law), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981); Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir.
1978) (valid reliance upon Fourth Circuit decision although Seventh Circuit had taken contrary
position), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979). But see Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792 (2d
Cir. 1981). Prior toHolsagerthe Second Circuit had upheld the constitutionality of New York's
assertion ofjurisdiction over parties pursuant to the doctrine of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216
N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). More importantly, the Second Circuit had upheld Seider
jurisdiction even after the Supreme Court had delivered the important and related decision in
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978). Nevertheless, after the Supreme Court overruled the
Seider doctrine, the Second Circuit refused to make the new rule prospective, partly because "the
volume of criticism of the Seider rule made the prospect of its continuing validity questionable."
646 F.2d at 797.
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based upon a minority line of authority.18 8
A troubling question raised by one circuit is whether a court may examine
the quality of reasoning in the cases upon which a party places his reliance. In
White v. Maggio,' 89 a state convict sought habeas corpus relief on the ground
that his criminal trial had been tainted by the refusal of the state to let defendant's ballistics expert examine two bullets that were important evidence at
trial. After the defendant had been convicted, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held in an unrelated case' 90 that such a denial of access to evidence was unlawful. The state pleaded for prospectivity on the ground that it
had relied upon state decisions that had clearly approved the practice. The
Fifth Circuit agreed that the line of authority had been undisputed, but still
held for retroactivity. The reliance by the state, the court reasoned, was not
particularly strong because other state decisions had endorsed pretrial inspections of such evidence as narcotics and weapons. 19 t Thus a party's reliance
was denied consideration because the party should not have relied upon a
fairly settled body of law that was to the party's advantage but was, with the
benefit of hindsight, not as well reasoned as the Fifth Circuit would have
preferred.
In most circumstances a party may rely upon a statute or a regulation
with as much confidence as upon case law. In United States v. Peltier19 2 the
Supreme Court found a satisfactory basis for reliance in "a validly enacted
' 93
[federal] statute, supported by longstanding administrative regulation."'
That holding would seem to have settled the matter, at least as far as federal
statutes and regulations are concerned.' 94 Even earlier, the Supreme Court
had struggled with a case in which plaintiffs sought recovery of payments
made to sectarian schools for educational services rendered pursuant to a state
statute that was subsequently declared unconstitutional. 19 Although the
holding in that cased focused more upon "the appropriate scope of federal
188. Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980) (party's reliance upon
one prior district court decision insufficient when two other prior district court decisions reached a
contrary result), rev'don other grounds,452 U.S. 205 (1981); Benedict Oil Co. v. United States, 582
F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (no valid reliance upon Fourth Circuit decision when two
other circuits and relevant IRS regulations reached a contrary result). An evenly split body of
authority also may fail to provide a sufficient basis for reliance. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d

1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (split of authority plus parties' awareness that Supreme Court is generally
unfriendly toward the sort of acts undertaken undercuts assertion of reliance), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.) (no valid reliance when two
other circuits have reached contradictory results), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
189. 556 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1977).
190. Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975).
191. 556 F.2d at 1356.
192. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
193. Id. at 541.
194. See United States v. Main, 598 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.) (reliance upon federal tax code and
IRS manual), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979); Bailey v. Holley, 530 F.2d 169 (7th Cir.) (parole
board regulations), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845 (1976); Bergstrom v. Kissinger, 387 F. Supp. 794
(D.D.C. 1974) (regulation
governing "selection-out" process for federal employees), aJ'd, 530
Cir. 1976).
F.2d 1093 (D.C.
195. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
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equitable remedies" than upon principles of retroactivity, 196 the Supreme
Court also noted that the schools had incurred expenses in reasonable reliance
upon the statute, making retroactivity inappropriate. Most lower courts have
followed that direction and have found sufficient reliance upon a variety of
state statutes.

197

One interesting case against that tide is probably no longer good law, but
8 addressed the
it raises an important point nonetheless. Alexander v. Weaver 19
retroactivity of a Supreme Court decision that held unconstitutional a state
statute restricting the eligibility of certain categories of persons for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children. 199 As part of their opposition to retroactive application of the Supreme Court decision, state officials argued that they
had relied upon the state statute for direction -indeed, they were bound by it.
The federal court demonstrated little sympathy, however, characterizing the
state's statutory overlay to federal legislation as self-serving. The court refused the plea for prospectivity and reasoned:
To permit this reliance as a defense against retroactive payments
would allow any state to promulgate a statute of dubious constitutionality limiting the funds it must expend at the minimal risk of a
subsequent finding of unconstitutionality (if indeed it is challenged)
which finding would come only some time later after the case had
gone the judicial route and which would deny retroactive relief thus
effect and savings at least during the pegiving the state the desired
2 °°
riod of its existence.
It is probably not necessary to adopt this jaundiced view of state legislative processes to agree that there might be special considerations regarding
reliance upon a rule by a party who influenced the development of that rule.
But as soon as agreement is reached upon that point, it becomes clear that
such a concern can easily be taken too far. Public agencies, in particular, are
often properly influential in the enactment of legislation they will enforce, and
it does not seem consistent with the public interest to discourage their contributions to the legislative process by threatening them with deprivation of the
right to rely upon rules they helped develop. 20 ' IfAlexander is no longer law,
then the point may be moot. A key question still remains, however: if we
assume that reliance by a party who helped write the rule can sometimes be
196. Id. at 199.
197. See, e.g., Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978) (statute sanctioning patronage
appointments of deputy sheriffs), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979); Kacher v. Pittsburgh Nat'l

Bank, 545 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1976) (replevin statute); Pruett v. Texas, 470 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir.) (en
banc) (sentencing statute), aft'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F.

Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court) (statute authorizing aid to sectarian colleges), aft'd,

426 U.S. 736 (1976).
1972) (three-judge court), vacatedandremarded,412 U.S. 914
198. 345 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Ill.
(1973). The result in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), see supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text, probably rendered Alexander devoid of precedential value.
199. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
200. 345 F. Supp. at 673.
201. See Americans United For Separation of Church & State v. Board of Educ., 369 F. Supp.
1059 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (public agencies must rely upon law they administer and normally cannot
obtain prior approval of their work from a court).
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insufficient as a defense against retroactivity, the issue of where to draw the
line remains unaddressed.
The last source from which reliance might be drawn may be described as
any practice that does not rise to the level of a formally adopted statute, judicial decision, or administrative regulation. The likelihood that such a foundation for reliance will be accepted by a court is uncertain. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, has held that an industry custom is
an insufficient basis for reliance. 20 2 In Weinburg v. Mitchell,20 3 however, in
which defendants in a civil suit sought prospectivity for a holding that the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment permitted no exception for
warrantless wiretaps, 2°4 the same circuit reached a different result. "There
may not have been any judicial authority for the warrantless wiretaps, but the
executive branch had long proceeded on the assumption that surveillance ex20 s
ercised in the interest of national security was within its power."
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also produced apparently
inconsistent results. After a panel overturned a state practice of requiring incarcerated criminal defendants to wear prison garb at their trials, the court
rejected the plea by the state for prospectivity. Although the state noted that
the practice in question was an old one, free of prior judicial criticism or
praise, the court responded magisterially, "Reliance on a blank slate is not
enough. ' 20 6 By contrast, consider.Bassett v. Smith, 20 7 in which a state pris-

oner sought habeas corpus relief because a jury instruction used in his trial
was subsequently held to violate due process. The state sought prospectivity
partly upon the ground that it had used the instruction in good faith for many
years, and this time the Fifth Circuit accepted the argument:
The State's reliance was concededly not founded upon any Supreme
Court decision sustaining the Georgia or similar charges against a
due process attack. Neverthless, the very absence of any action on
the part of the federal courts condemning this nearly century-old
practice of the Georgia courts prior to [the date of the law-changing
decision] inevitably gave rise to the implication that the practice did
202. American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).

203. 588 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1978). The Weinberg opinion makes no mention of American
Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921

(1975), discussed supra text accompanying note 202.
204. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
205. 588 F.2d at 277. Note that both American Timber and Weinberg were civil actions for
damages. The cases seem to be distinguishable, if at all, upon the basis that in Weinberg defendants were former government officials who might be presumed to have been acting for the public
good, rather than private gain. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en
banc), rev'donothergrounds, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), in which Judge Wilkey, dissenting, suggested

that a party should be able to rely upon a legal scholar's view of a Supreme Court decision.
206. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 210(5th Cir. 1974), rev'don othergrounds, 425 U.S. 501

(1976).
207. 464 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973). Judge Ainsworth, who
wrote the opinion of the court in Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), discussed supra
text accompanying note 206, cited Basset with the parenthetical "but see."
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not offend the Constitution. 20 8
Finally, three circuits, among them the Fifth Circuit, have recently addressed the retroactivity of United States v. Mauro,209 in which the Supreme
Court held that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act 2 10 required certain
procedural protections for criminal defendants who were moved around the
country for criminal prosecution. All three circuits concluded that Mauro
should not be accorded retroactivity, partly because prosecutors were entitled
to rely upon what the Third Circuit called "the unsettled state of the law prior
to Mauro.,,2 11
5.

Equity Breeds Success

The third factor of Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron is usually described
either as a consideration of the equities, or the effect of retroactivity upon the
administration of justice.2 12 Although there are decisions in which this factor
has received cursory 2 13 or confused 2 14 treatment, on the whole the analysis of
208. 464 F.2d at 351. The panel noted, however, that "[t]he Georgia charge was never an
object of scholarly or judicial praise." Id. at 352. Cf. Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792,
797 (2d Cir. 1981) (no valid reliance upon old rule that had been heavily criticized).
209. 436 U.S. 340 (1978).
210. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-8 (1976).
211. United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 593 (3d Cir. 1980). Accord United States v. Hill,
622 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1980); Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979). The panel in Hill
was entirely different from the panel in Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974). Williams, which had been reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds, was not cited in Hill.
212. In Linkletter the court pondered the implications of retroactivity for the judicial system.
381 U.S. at 637. In Chevron the court described the third factor as "the inequity imposed by
retroactive application." 404 U.S. at 107.
213. See, e.g., Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1290 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'don
other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (1981):
we note that defendants have failed to persuade us that retroactive application of our
ruling will retard the operation of the [Truth in Lending Act] or cause undue hardship.
The Act requires disclosure of security interests as defined by Regulation Z. Our ruling
merely implements that requirement. It does not disturb any clear rulings or precedents
on which defendants may have relied to their detriment. We can see no inequity in its
retroactive application.
See also Matter of S/S Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 754 (5th Cir. 1976) ("a holding of retroactivity
would not 'produce substantial inequitable results' in this case. It seems unlikely, for example,
that the parties' conduct leading to the Helena-White Alder collision was in any way influenced
by the pre-Reliable Transfer divided damages rule"); Radcliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 1093, 1096
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975) ("We believe that the principles of 'basic fairness' mentioned in Robinson and 'essential justice' mentioned in Gosa require that the Lamb
decision be applied retroactively").
214. The list of cases in which the courts seem to have misconstrued the third factor is short,
though some of the comments are rather stark. Jenkins v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 460
F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1978), was a class action for retroactive application of an earlier decision
holding unconstitutional a federal statute requiring illegitimate children applying for Civil Service
Survivor Annuities to show they had lived with the Civil Service parent. Addressing the third
factor, the court said, "Furthermore, the equities weigh in favor of retroactive application in that
the unconstitutional deprivation of benefits to the members of the class would otherwise go unremedied." .d. at 613. How that situation was more severe than Linkletter, in which persons
denied a constitutional right remained in jail, is not clear.
The other particularly troubling case in this area is Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F.
Supp. 35 (E.D. Va. 1976), aJ7'd, 579 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979), in
which an employee who was fired brought a grievance to a labor arbitration process but delayed
making a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The employee believed
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this factor has produced a fairly consistent body ofjudicial opinion. The effect
factor usually has weighed in favor of retroactivity if the court is unable to
identify a consequence that is either fundamentally unfair 2 15 or otherwise
laden with real-world implications for the operation of administrative or judicial bodies. Novak v. Harris21 6 is representative of a number of district court
cases in which pragmatic considerations influenced the result. The issue in
Novak was whether a widower not dependent upon his deceased spouse was
entitled to retroactive application of Caiffano v. Goldfarb,217 in which the
Supreme Court had held that the Social Security Act's dependency requirement for widowers was unconstitutional. The district court decided in favor of
retroactivity for Goldfarb:
Two significant points militate against nonretroactive application of
Goldfarb. Specifically, this court is not dealing with a class of widowers; the court is concerned solely with a single claimant whose
claim was pending at the time of the decision in Goldfarb. Although
consideration should be given to the potential impact of granting retroactive effect in the present case, this court is cognizant of the concrete individual rights of the plaintiff, Harry Novak. Second, in
measuring the hardships suffered by each party, the court initially
must be satisfied that retroactive payment would produce substantial
inequitable results. This court cannot conclude that an award of retroactive benefits to one person, for a period of some two and one-half
years, would have any significant impact upon the fiscal integrity of
the Social Security system. Indeed, it would be inequitable for Mr.
Novak to be denied his right to widowers' benefits for a limited period of time because, during that 2period,
there existed an unconstitu18
tional gender-based requirement.
Mr. Novak was fortunate that his lawyer did not bring a class action.2 1 9 Aside
that the statute of limitations for such a complaint was tolled pending the outcome of arbitration,
but subsequently the rule was established that arbitration did not toll the statute. The court applied the new rule prospectively because "Title VII evinces a strong policy in favor of airing
employment discrimination grievances." Id. at 41.
215. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
894 (1981), in which the Board promulgated a new rule providing back pay for unlawfully discharged striking employees who had not asked for reinstatement to theirjobs. Holding in favor of
retroactivity, the court said:
retroactive application will not create substantial injustice or undue hardship for either

party. The Board finds no valid reason for distinguishing between the status of an unlawfully discharged striker and of an unlawfully discharged working employee. Contrary to the Company's claim, the rule enforced here does not provide a windfall to

striking employees but merely places the burden of undoing the wrong on the wrongdoer, where it seems properly to belong.
Id. at 757. Accord Haney v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 498 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (new rule
requiring exhaustion of arbitration remedy; retroactivity appropriate because court will ensure
that in subsequent litigation defendant will not raise defense of laches).
216. 504 F. Supp. 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
217. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
218. 504 F. Supp. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
219. Other cases also seem to have taken account of the presence or absence of a class in

making a decision on retroactivity. Shannon v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 444 F. Supp.
354 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (class relief available only to extent of readily retrievable records or when
individual parties made requests on their own initiative), mod#edon otherground, 621 F.2d 1030
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from that pragmatic consideration, the decision in Novak is interesting for its
use of an extension of the original Linkletter/Chevron line of thought. While
the Supreme Court used those decisions to evaluate the burden retroactivity
might impose upon the administration ofjustice in the courts, Novak and sim2 20
ilar cases address the potential administrative impact of retroactivity.

Beyond those wrinkles, the effect factor seems to be one over which the
courts have exercised considerable discretion. In this area, civil and criminal

cases alike evince a thoughtful, measured approach to the issue, producing
decisions the analysis and results of which are difficult to criticize. 22 1 Equity,

or basic fairness--concepts American courts encountered long before Linkletter-has produced consistent and reasonable results.
6.

Differences Between Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron

As the Supreme Court recently made clear, it considers the Chevron anal-

ysis to be distinct, applicable uniquely to civil litigation. 222 It remains true,
however, that Chevron developed in the wake of Linkletter/Stovall and ap-

pears to have borrowed heavily from the earlier doctrine. 223 Those circumstances may help explain why, over the past decade, lower courts have been

considerably less clear in differentiating Chevron from Linkletter/Stovall, and
when distinctions have been drawn, they may explain why such distinctions
are not always the same as those the Supreme Court has identified.
The manner in which the Supreme Court first approached retroactivity in

civil litigation at least allowed the possibility that the Court contemplated a
close analogue to the retroactivity analysis emerging from the Linklet-

ter/Stovall line.224 Originally left unstated was how close the relationship was

(9th Cir. 1980); cf. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975) (retroactivity ordered
partly because government was unable to show that back payments to class will undermine trust
fund), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Brown v. United States, 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975); Aznavorian v. Califano, 440 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (same).
220. But see Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973) (refusing retroactivity for O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), because such a result would produce significant judicial and administrative costs).
221. Examples of particularly thoughtful analysis include Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d
792 (2d Cir. 1981) (retroactivity not inequitable because party injured thereby will merely have
failed to win a gamble on obtaining a more lucrative forum); Aufiero v. Clarke, 639 F.2d 49, 51
(1st Cir.) (prospectivity, because persons likely to be injured by retroactivity were "blameless"),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981); Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.) (en bane) (retroactivity would produce an avalanche of reversals), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); Rudolph v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 586 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1978) (no retroactivity because party who thereby loses
could have prevented situation simply by filing a timely complaint), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 924
(1979); Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1972) (burden of retroactivity upon state is
manageable because only 122 persons are affected), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973); United
States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (prisoner seeking expungement of
records of disciplinary actions taken without due process gets expungement because no great administrative burden is involved).
222. United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2587 n.12, 2594-95 (1982).
223. Moreover, the Supreme Court once treated civil and criminal cases as essentially the
same for retroactivity purposes. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 627 ("no distinction [will
be] drawn between civil and criminal litigation").
224. Until recently, the similarities between Linkletter/Sovall and Chew'on have always
seemed more important than the differences. See Beytagh, supra note 11, at 1582.
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to be and in what circumstances the approaches to civil and criminal retroactivity cases nominally under the broad umbrella of Linkletter/Stovall-or perhaps more aptly, Linkletter/Stovall/Chevron-may begin to diverge. Thus,
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit wrote that Chevron was an appropriate test for "conventional retroactivity analysis," a term that included many
criminal cases, but that:
[in] contrast, when the exclusionary rule is involved, retroactivity
analysis focuses on whether the purposes underlying the exclusionary
rule would be furthered by retroactive application. If neither judicial
integrity nor deterrence of official misconduct would be enhanced by
retroactive employment of the exclusionary rule, then it will be given
prospective application only. See United States v. Peltier.... 22s
Even when courts have agreed that a distinction should be drawn between
civil and criminal matters, the circuits have been unable to concur among
themselves as to the consequences such categorization should produce. While
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit commented that Chevron establishes
226
a stricter test to be met before a court can decide in favor of prospectivity,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that in civil cases considerations of reliance and
a need for stability in the law weigh in favor of prospectivity.2 27 Two other
circuits have joined in the fray. The Seventh Circuit has taken sides with the
Fifth Circuit by holding that prospectivity will be more nearly preferred in
criminal cases.2 28 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
on the other hand, has been more tentative, preferring an approach that seems
to fall between that of the Fourth Circuit and that of the Tenth:
Historically, prospectivity has been less common in civil than in
criminal cases. This is at least partly due to the potential flood of
habeas corpus petitions that looms if a court recognizes retroactively
a procedural or substantive right of criminal defendants. No such
threat arises in civil litigation where a retroactive decision can affect
only suits pending in the courts or not yet brought, but cannot be
raised by previously unsuccessful litigants. The prospectivity determination in both civil and criminal cases, however, remains a pragmatic one that turns on the expected impact of a retroactive
overruling on the society and legal system.
[Wle think that a stronger case for prospectivity, rather than retroactivity, might be made in a criminal case involving the exclusionary
rule, where the prophylactic purpose of that rule cannot be served by
retroactive application and where the costs to society of retroactivity
may be far greater. In a damage action the effect of the warrant rule
articulated in the [law-changing decisions at issue in the case at bar]
is to recognize a substantive right to compensation for injury. Retro225. Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir. 1979).
226. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 501

(1976).
227. Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978), iert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979).
228. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
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active application would therefore seem fully consonant with those
decisions .... 229
As it turns out, none of the positions enunciated in any of those decisions
is the prevalent view, for the largest body of decisions simply treats Linklet-

ter/Stovall and Chevron as essentially the same test. Some decisions make
that point explicitly, 230 but the more common practice is to link the two deci-

sions either by citing Linkletter/Stovall (or their criminal progeny) in a civil

context, 23 1 or Chevron in a criminal matter.23 2 Ironically, numbered among

the circuits treating Linkletter/Stovail and Chevron as fungible are most of
233

those that sought to explain the differences between the doctrines.
234
The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in UnitedStates v. Johnson

should end the mixing of Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron. The confusion over
the past decade, however, with undetermined implications for affected retroac-

tivity decisions, is itself a most unfortunate result. It would seem that either
the lower courts were unable to follow a clear lead, or that the Supreme Court
229. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172, 1176-77, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981); accord United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 950 (E.D. Pa.
1973) (Linkletter applies to civil and criminal cases, "but other factors will become relevant because the effects of civil remedies may differ from criminal remedies").
230. Burkhart v. Saxbe, 448 F. Supp. 588, 599 n.22 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (with regard to retroactivity, "the [Supremel Court apparently has not distinguished between civil and criminal cases or
constitutional and nonconstitutional issues in developing this area of jurisprudence"), moded on
other grounds sub noma. Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
913 (1981); cf. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 627 (7th Cir. 1973) ("Nor does it matter that
Miller and this case arise in a civil rather than a criminal context").
231. Ruotolo v. Gould, 489 F.2d 1324 (1st Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court), aft'd, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Wood v.
United States Post Office Dep't, 381 F. Supp. 1371 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aird,511 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir.
1975).
232. United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Tucker, 610 F.2d
1007 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Stewart, 595 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
233. Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1981) (habeas case citing Chevron); United States
v. Hill, 622 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1980) (criminal appeal citing Chevron); United States v. Petersen,
611 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1979) (criminal appeal citing Chevron), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980);
Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979) (habeas case citing Chevron), cert denied, 446 U.S.
916 (1980); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (appeal of
agency decision citing Linkletter); National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1118 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (appeal of agency decision citing Linklefter); Haney v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 498
F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (civil appeal citing Linkletter).
Of interest is the degree of overlap in membership on the panels deciding the cases cited
supra notes 225-27 and 229, and the apparently contradictory views from the same circuits cited in
this footnote. Judge Ainsworth of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit wrote the opinions in
Batle and Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on othergrounds, 425 U.S. 501
(1976), but he did not mention the Williams decision in Battie. The Supreme Court reversed
Williams on other grounds, which may explain why it was not cited.
Both Judges Barrett and McKay sat on the panels of Petersen and Savina Home Indus. v.
Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979). Moreover, Judge Barrett wrote the opinion in
Petersen and Judge McKay wrote the opinion in Savina. Nevertheless, Petersen does not cite
Savina.
There is no overlap between the panel that sat for Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), and the panels that sat for NationalAss'n of Broadcasters,Action for Children'sTelevision, and Haney. Zweibon, the most recently decided of the
cases, does not cite any of the others.
234. See 102 S. Ct. 2579 (1982), discussed supra notes 96-97 and accompanying tekt.
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235
was unable to offer one.

B. Alternatives to Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron
1. Diversity
In diversity cases, the decision of the Supreme Court in Vandenbark v.

Owens-Illinois Glass Co. 236 commands the lower courts to treat retroactivity as
a substantive matter under the Erie doctrine.2 37 As Vandenbark construes

Erie, that means the federal courts are to apply the decision of the state
supreme court prevailing at the time the federal judgment is to be entered,
238
resulting in automatic retroactivity in diversity matters.
The investigation made for this article included only a few diversity cases,

but courts in most of those studied were able to apply the rule of Vandenbark
routinely. 239 A few other cases, mostly in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, raised the only troubling question to come to light: if Vandenbark is
taken literally and federal courts sitting in diversity are to apply state rules
announced while litigation is pending, how can a federal court uphold a state
retroactivity rule that might, in particular circumstances, require prospectivity? In that respect, the eagerness in Vandenbark to adhere to Erie has pro-

240
duced a possibility of distorting the doctrine Erie meant to establish.
The solution has been to take Vandenbark at somewhat less than face
value, grafting onto it the larger Erie principle that federal courts should do

what state courts would do in the same situation. Downs v. J. M. Huber

Corp.241 demonstrated the success of that approach. Downs turned upon the
duty an owner of property owed to a business invitee. The trial court had
applied the existing state rule that an owner had no duty to warn or protect
invitees against obvious dangers of which the invitee should have been aware.
While the case was pending on appeal, however, the state supreme court
235. Assuming that some of the mixtures of the two analyses involved more than harmless
error, are there now persons in prisons who can make collateral attacks upon the retroactivity
decisions in their cases? Are they required to have preserved the issue with objections - that is,
should they have more clearly understood than almost all the federal courts that Chevron and
Linkletter/Stovall were different? See supra notes 26-30, 81-85 and accompanying text.
236. 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
237. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). While controlled by Erie, the rule of
Vandenbark is also an outgrowth of the doctrine of United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 103 (1801). 311 U.S. at 541-42.
238. 311 U.S. at 543.
239. See, e.g., Baker v. Outboard Marine Corp., 595 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1979); Samuels v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 588 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1979). In many cases the principle of Vandenbark is
applied without a reference to the Supreme Court case. Ettinger v. Central Penn Nat'l Bank, 634
F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980); Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1973); Avila v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp. 431 (C.D. Cal. 1979), a'd, 651 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1981).
Vandenbark has even been cited in nondiversity cases for the "settled rule" of automatic retroactivity when the law changes before a decision is final. Robinson v. Heilman, 563 F.2d 1304, 1307
(9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); C. Blake McDowell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 71 (1978).
240. Nelson v. Brunswick Corp., 503 F.2d 376, 381-82 n.12 (9th Cir. 1974); see generally 1A pt.
2 J. MoORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL. & J. WICKER, Moonn's FEDERAL PRACTICE 10.307[3] (2d
ed. 1982 & Cum. Supp. 1982-83).
241. 580 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1978).

]RETRO4CTIVITY

1983]

changed the duty to one of reasonable care.2 42 The panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged its discomfort with the apparent
requirement in Vandenbark for retroactivity even in circumstances in which

the state might have preferred a different result. With that consideration in
mind, the court made a more searching examination of the retroactivity issue
than Vandenbark required. Noting that the state supreme court had typically
been quite explicit when it displayed a preference for prospectivity, the court
commented that in this instance no preference had been expressed in the state
court. 243 Moreover, the law-changing decision had been foreshadowed by two

earlier state decisions. The Fifth Circuit in Downs, therefore, made the state
decision retroactive, as Vandenbark would have, but the court had traveled a

more circuitous route than Vandenbark directs.244 That apparent quirk in
Vandenbark resolved, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit does not seem
245
to have encountered further difficulty with the rule in diversity cases.

2. Retroactivity for Agency Matters
Retroactivity for agency policies or practice is also covered by a special
retroactivity rule:
Appellate courts ordinarily apply the law in effect at the time of the
appellate decision, see Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711

. * **However, a court reviewing an agency decision following an
intervening change of policy by the agency should remand to permit
the agency to decide in the first instance whether giving the change
best effectuate the policies underlying the
retrospective effect will246

agency's governing act.

The direction is not free from ambiguity, establishing as it does only one factor-the purpose factor of Linkletter and Chevron-thatthe agency presuma-

bly must consider before reaching its decision. Also left uncertain is the
242. Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978). Note that when this circumstance arises in cases involving federal questions, nearly automatic retroactivity is achieved. See
supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 251-65 and accompanying text.
243. 580 F.2d at 796.
244. 580 F.2d at 796-97.
245. In Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., Am. Home Prods., 594 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1979), decided a year after Downs, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used its modified
Vandenbark approach without a mention of the original problem:
Appellant's third challenge to the employment of this statute as a defense centers around
a decision by the Florida Supreme Court that declared the applicable statute unconstitutional subsequent to the trial below. Linville v. State of Florida, 359 So.2d 450 (Fla.
1978). The court in Linville failed to address the issue of retroactive application of their
decision. While this may be some evidence of a reluctance to so apply its decision, the
court's silence on this issue is certainly not conclusive evidence of a decision not to apply
its decision retroactively. However, without any direct evidence that the court intended
to apply its decision retroactively, we decline to apply Linville to the instant case.
Id. at 1057. Of some additional interest is the failure of the Fifth Circuit to give the law-changing
decision the presumption of retroactivity that would be characteristic even of the Linkletter/Stovall or Chevron lines.
246. NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 10 n.10 (1974). Seesupra
note 77.
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standard reviewing courts are to use when, after "the first instance," the
agency's retroactivity decision arrives in the judicial arena on appeal.
In NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc.,2 47 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit faced precisely those questions. In the course of adjudicating
a labor dispute, the Board had applied retroactively a new policy granting
back pay to an unlawfully discharged striking employee. Prior to the Board's
change of policy, it had for thirty years refused back pay to unlawfully discharged striking employees, granting it only to those who were unlawfully discharged while working.2 4 8 When the Board's decision on retroactivity came
before the court, it used the three-factor appoach of Chevron when it affirmed
the agency analysis. Although the language the court used does not clarify the
matter entirely, it appears that the panel was unaware of the inconsistency in
reviewing a one-factor agency retroactivity analysis with the more elaborate
mechanism of Chevron:
In the instant case, the matter seems settled for us because the new
rule was not an unforeshadowed departure from the Board's previously existing practice, and the Board has sufficiently demonstrated a
basis for its view that retroactive application will further rather than
retard the operation of the rule. In addition, retroactive application
will not create substantial injustice or undue hardship for either
party. The Board finds no valid reason for distinguishing between
the status of an unlawfully discharged striker and of an unlawfully
discharged working employee. Contrary to the Company's claim,
the rule enforced here does not provide a windfall to striking employees but merely places the burden of undoing the wrong on the
wrongdoer, where it seems properly to belong. 249
The Board appeared to have made the determination of the purpose factor,
while the assessment of the other two Chevron factors apparently was left to
the court. Assuming that the court was as able as the Board to make a determination upon the novelty rule, it is difficult to understand how the judicial
panel would normally be as well equipped as the Board to assess the effect
factor of Chevron. Although the opinion in Lyon & Ryan Ford is unquestionably thoughtful, and the decision appears to be correct, the approach usedwhich may be exactly the one the Supreme Court mandated-raises more apprehensions than it resolves.25 0 At the very least, it creates a possibility that
an agency will carefully and correctly weigh the purpose factor-the sole factor assigned to it-only to be overturned upon judicial review when the court
examines the other two factors. A more purposeless activity can hardly be
imagined.
247. 647 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
248. Id. at 755.

249. Id at 757.
250. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had a much easier task in NLRB v. Cam-

bridge Wire Cloth Co., 622 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1980), in which it merely had to remand a matter
to the Board so that the agency could make the initial retroactivity analysis.
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Schooner Peggy

As we have seen, for civil cases on direct appeal, the Supreme Court has

continued to respect the ancient rule of Schooner Peggy, which commands that
25
in such litigation intervening changes of law will be applied retroactively. '

The rule is subject to exceptions only when it will produce "manifest injustice,"2 52 a term that remains undefined by the Court. For the most part, fed-

eral courts have experienced no difficulty in distinguishing the body of cases
subject to Schooner Peggy from those that fall under Linkletter/Stovall or

Chevron, and the result has been decisions that are, if nothing else, straightforward and easily reached.25 3

A particularly interesting demonstration of the rigor with which this rule
operates arose in a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Zichy v. City of Philadeohia254 was a class action alleging sex discrimination
in the city's approach to maternity leave for female employees. The district

court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, but while the case was pending
on appeal the Supreme Court held that an employer's disability plan was not
unlawful simply because it did not include pregnancy benefits.25 5 Based upon
the new rule of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed and remanded the case so the district court could determine whether
an amended complaint would permit plaintiff's case to continue on other
grounds. On remand the lower court denied a motion to amend, and plaintiffs
appealed.
Once again, however, a Supreme Court decision intervened, this time by

a holding that an employer's policy forcing female employees who take maternity leave to lose accumulated seniority constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.2 56 Addressing the argument that the second Supreme Court decision
could not be permitted to overturn the law of the case developed during the
251. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 103 (1801). See also supra notes 6879 and accompanying text.
252. Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 716 (1974). See supra note 73.
253. See, e.g., Women's Health Serv., Inc. v. Maher, 636 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1980); Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833
(1978); Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1977); California v.
Italian Motorship Ilice, 534 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1976); Kinsman Marine Transit Co. v. Great Lakes
Towing Co., 532 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). The foregoing cases all involve intervening judicial lawmaking that was applied retroactively to cases on direct appeal, but the rule also
applies to intervening statutory changes as well. Scarboro v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 619 F.2d 621
(6th Cir.) (per curiam) (congressional amendment to Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
Indeed, Schooner Peggy itself involved an intervening change of law through ratification of a
treaty.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that a party's reliance upon the decision
of the district court that has been appealed does not trigger an exception based upon "manifest
injustice" to a Schooner Peggy result. McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 569 F.2d 276, 278 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam) (neither law nor equity compels such an exception), cert.denied,
449 U.S. 1014 (1980). No case was identified in which the "manifest injustice" exception was
applied.
254. 590 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1979).
255. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
256. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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first appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit simply opted for the
SchoonerPeggy rule:
This court has a duty to apply a supervening rule of law despite its
prior decisions to the contrary when the new legal rule is valid and
applicable to the issues of the case. . . . Here, the Supreme Court's
decision. . . intervened between the first time the case was before 257
us
and this appeal. Therefore we are not bound by our prior holding.
Even the law-of-the-case doctrine, 258 normally triumphant, had to change
course to let the Schooner Peggy pass.
As settled as the practice is of retroactively applying law-changing decisions to civil cases on direct appeal, the appellate courts have been careful not
to use the SchoonerPeggy doctine outside the precise confines of the particular
situation to which it applies--civil cases on appeal. That practice has been
followed even when the facts of a case suggest that some expansion of the
scope of Schooner Peggy would be consistent with the logic of the rule. In
Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,259 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit refused just such an opportunity to use the doctrine. Plaintiffs in Cates
alleged racial discrimination. They initially survived a motion to dismiss their
claim as time-barred because the district court reasoned that filing a Title VII
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission also tolled
the statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The
Supreme Court then held that filing a complaint with the Commission does
not toll a statute of limitations applicable to section 1981,260 and the trial court
thereupon dismissed the complaint. On direct appeal, plaintiffs cited Chevron
as a basis for applying prospectively the law-changing decision of the Supreme
Court.
If ever a circumstance existed in which the rule of Schooner Peggy might
appropriately be expanded beyond its current boundary, Cates would seem to
present that circumstance. The lower court was, after all, still in a pretrial
posture when the Supreme Court made its decision, so applying the new rule
would not significantly disrupt the existing course of litigation any more than
it would had Cates already gone through trial and was on direct appeal-in
fact, it would represent a smaller disruption. Although the Second Circuit
concluded that the new Supreme Court rule should apply retroactively, it did
so without reference to any of the cases in the Schooner Peggy line. Instead,
the appellate court simply held that the plaintiffs in Cates had delayed in asserting their rights and therefore did not have a good prospectivity plea under
Chevron.261 Cates and Zichy together suggest that the Schooner Peggy doctrine remains vigorous and flourishing, but only when it puts its roots into the
very special soil of civil cases on direct appeal.
257. 590 F.2d at 508.
258. See IB J. MooRE & T. CURRIER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.404 (2d ed. 1982 &
Cum. Supp. 1982-83).

259. 561 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1977).
260. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
261. 561 F.2d at 1073-74.
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One reason why use of SchoonerPeggy has not expanded becomes clearer
in light of a few cases in which it was not used, especially upon consideration
of the results that might have occurred had the doctrine been applied. In Kelly
v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Board2 62 black schoolteachers who had
been laid off in a school system reorganization sued to recover their jobs, alleging that the dismissal process was tainted by racial bias and otherwise provided inadequate due process protections. Before the case reached appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided another matter in which it established certain procedural requirements for such layoffs. That rule, however, was not made applicable to Kelly:
The plaintiffs were laid off by the letter dated August 8, 1969. That
was before Singleton [v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District,
419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1979)] was decided. The defendants could
not anticipate Singleton's subsequent holding that the criteria used in
selecting the teacher to be laid off "shall be available for public
in2 63
spection." Clearly, that part of Singleton is not retroactive.
If the plaintiffs had lost at trial and had been on appeal at the time Singleton was decided, Schooner Peggy would have compelled a reversal, irrespective of what the defendants could have anticipated at the time of the layoffs.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressed similar sentiments
in an analogous situation. In Cle-Ware Industries v. Sokolsky 264 that circuit
strongly disapproved a practice in bankruptcy matters of compensating two
different attorneys for their respective work as counsel for the debtor and
counsel for the debtor-in-possession. Arguably the inappropriateness of draining two different fees from "one and the same person" should have been manifest to all concerned, but the court nevertheless made its decision prospective
only:
In the present case . . . we are confronted by a situation where an

able and experienced Bankruptcy Judge has followed this practice in
accordance with previously established precedent in his District at a
time when there was no precedent to the contrary in this Circuit.
Two sets of attorneys have devoted considerable time and effort in
this Chapter XI proceeding which resulted in the confirmation of a
Plan of Arrangement continuing the economic life of Cle-Ware and
its subsidiaries. The Bankruptcy Judge avoided the considerable expenses of a receivership, yet kept the debtor corporations functioning
as a continuing enterprise.
Appellants contend that no fee should be allowed to counsel for
the debtor. This appears to be a question of first impression in this
Circuit and we apply today's rule only prospectively. We are unwilling to make this rule applicable in the
present case because of the
265
obvious inequities that would result.
262.
263.
264.
265.

517 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 199.
493 F.2d 863 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 829 (1974).
Id. at 871.
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Nevertheless, if the case had been on appeal when a similar law-changing decision came down in an unrelated case, the "obvious inequities" would not
have mattered at all.
In both Kelly and Cle-Ware the predicament retroactivity would have
created, and the perceived unfairness it would involve created the degree of
appellate sympathy necessary to produce holdings of prospectivity. If those
courts were correct in their estimate of the hardships a rigid rule of automatic
retroactivity would impose, we are left to wonder why it is that automatic
retroactivity for civil cases which happen to have reached the appellate stage
of litigation is nonetheless acceptable.
4. Retroactivity for Jurisdictional Matters
Anyone familiar with retroactivity analysis who reads the recent Supreme
Court opinions in FirestoneTire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord2 66 and Northern Jipe-

line Construction Co. v. MarathonPipe Line Co. 267 may well experience an
overwhelming sense of dejA vu. A decade ago the Court seemed to present a
bold requirement for retroactivity in law-changing cases that reduced the jurisdiction of a court,2 68 only to draw back from that position in a subsequent
case. 269 Then in 1981 the Court produced Risord: "A court lacks discretion
to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction, and thus,
'2 70
by definition, a jurisdictional ruling may never be made prospective only."
"Never" proved to be a very short time. In June 1982 the Court held that
bankruptcy judges could not hear bankruptcy cases. In the words of the
Court, "the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts contained in
§ 241(a) [of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978] is unconstitutional." 27 1 The Court
also held, without any reference
to Risjord, that "our decision today shall ap' '2 72
ply only prospectively.
The law in this area of retroactivity analysis has therefore undergone significant disruption recently, and it is difficult to determine which twist in the
road will be the last. The experience of the lower courts in the last ten years,
however, may be of value, because the decisions of the Supreme Court during
the early 1970s seem also to be characterized by some of the confusion present
in Riord and Northern Pipeline. There is, however, an important difference
between the decisions of the early 1970s and the more recent opinions. The
difference arises from some of the language used in the earlier cases. Although
2 74
273
United States v. United States Coin & Currency and Robinson v. Ne!1
266. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
267. 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982).
268. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973); United States v. United States Coin & Currency,
401 U.S. 715 (1971). See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
269. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973). See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text,
270. 449 U.S. at 379.
271. Northern Pipeline, 102 S. Ct. at 2880.
272. Id.
273. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
274. 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
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ultimately came to be seen as cases whose results are based upon jurisdictional
considerations, 275 their emphasis upon the importance of the constitutional
rights at issue-self-incrimination in UnitedStates Coin and double jeopardy

in Robinson-led some courts to believe that the decisions stood for retroactivity in cases involving fundamental, nonprocedural rights. In those cases the
jurisdictional element in the Supreme Court decisions received correspondingly less weight.

The distortion that could thereby result was exemplified by an opinion
from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Radciffv. Anderson 276 addressed the retroactivity of a decision striking down a state statute that dis-

criminated between the sexes by setting different maximum ages at which

females and males could claim the benefit of juvenile court processes. 277 The

law-changing case itself had directed that it would not apply retroactively,27 8
and the Radciff panel acknowledged that the old law had not damaged the

accuracy or fairness of trial processes. Considered on those facts alone it
might appear that the decision would be in favor of prospectivity, but in fact

the court reached the opposite conclusion: "We believe that the principles of
'basic fairness' mentioned in Robinson and 'essential justice' mentioned in
Gosa require that the [law-changing] decision be applied retroactively." 2 79

Other courts successfully hurdled the fundamental-rights language, only
275. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2587-88 (1982).
276. 509 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975).
277. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972).
278. Id. at 20. No effort was made in this investigation to compile statistics on the number or
percentage of cases in which both the law-changing decision and the retroactivity decision were
announced at the same time. The impression gathered, however, is that only a minority of lawchanging cases also contain a decision on the retroactivity issue.
279. 509 F.2d at 1096. Another case in which the fundamental-right language distorted the
reasoning and result in a lower court is Baynor v. Warden, 391 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Md. 1975). The
district court had to rule upon the retroactivity of a Supreme Court decision holding that time
served on a vacated conviction had to be credited to the sentence handed down after a second
trial:
The new rule is clearly not procedural, having nothing to do with the use of evidence or
with a particular mode of trial. It is rather a rule of substantive, fundamental constitutional law made mandatory on the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence, it is presumptively retroactive.
Id. at 1253-54. Cf.Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835, 839 (4th Cir. 1979) ("the guarantee against
double jeopardy is 'significantly different' from other new procedural guarantees which are generally non-retroactive"). Even in a particularly sophisticated analysis a court was unable to divorce
itself completely from the fundamental right thesis. See United States ex rel. Williams v. Preiser,
360 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (abortionist convicted in 1966 sought release by pleading retroactive application of the famous abortion rights case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)), aft'd,
497 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1974):
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court established that a statute such as section 1050 of
former New York Penal Law is violative of the Due Process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court did not expressly rule on the retrospectivity of its abortion decisions, but recent pronouncements by the Court as to this aspect of its constitutional adjudications of criminal cases strongly support the notion that a judicial decision
as to a substantive freedom should be afforded retrospective effect.
360 F. Supp. at 668 (citing, inter alia, Robinson v. Neil). The court presented a thoughtful approach, certaily but one which would have been better founded ifit rested upon the inability of
a court to punish a pe-son for protected activity, rather than upon the fundamentality of the right
protecting that activity.
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to falter upon the split between United States Coin/Robinson and Gosa. In
United States v. Bodey28 0 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit abjured
the use of a L'nkletter/Chevron2 81 analysis because the principle involved in
the law-changing decision was a matter of double jeopardy, and therefore was
controlled by Robinson.282 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, by
contrast, took its hint from Gosa when it dealt with the retroactivity of a decision holding unlawful the procedure by which certain court martials had been
of the Linkletconvened. 28 3 The result, per Gosa, was the application 284
ter/Stovall analysis and a decision in favor of prospectivity.
Notwithstanding the confusion, some retroactivity analyses in the last
decade have been quite thoughtful.2 85 For that reason, the area cannot simply
be dismissed as a quagmire, even though recent Supreme Court decisions offer
little evidence of clarification.
5.

United States v. Peltier: The Retroactivity Analysis That Never Was

In 1975 the Supreme Court decided UnitedStates v. Peltier.28 6 The decision made prospective an earlier holding that a warrantless automobile search
by federal Border Patrol agents acting without probable cause at a substantial
distance from the national border violated the fourth amendment. 287 The decision could have been fairly routine. Indeed, as Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion pointed out, the practice of the Court typically had been to make deci280. 607 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1979).
281. It was the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that linked those two approaches. See
supra note 232 and accompanying text.
282. "These cases [Chevron and Linkletter] were concerned with the applicability of new rules
to parties who had relied on the old rules to their disadvantage. The Supreme Court specifically
distinguished the Linkletter line of cases in a later double jeopardy decision." 607 F.2d at 268
(citing Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973)).
283. The law-changing case was United States v. Greenwell, 19 C.M.A. 460 (1970).
284. Brown v. United States, 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975).
285. Such cases include Blackburn v. Cross, 510 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1975). The petitioner in
Blackburn sought to overturn his conviction because at trial the prosecution used testimony of a
victim of an earlier, similar crime - notwithstanding earlier acquittal of defendant on that
charge. Subsequent to the conviction, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a state
was collaterally estopped from relitigating for any purpose an issue determined in a prior prosecution of the same defendant. Although the law-changing case was grounded in double jeopardy
principles, the court did not mechanically conclude that the case was synonymous with Robinson.
Instead, the court said the law-changing case was:
rooted in the principle of double jeopardy, [but] its operation merely precludes the introduction of certain disfavored evidence. In light of the Robinson rationale it would be
unreasonable for us to conclude that the Supreme Court in Robinson was addressing
itself to the exclusion of evidence of prior crimes and, hence, intended Robinson to apply
to procedural guarantees based upon the principle of double jeopardy. We therefore
prefer to rest our decision upon the Linkletter line of cases.
Id. at 1017.
Another case, Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1981), considered whether the
rule of retroactivity for jurisdictional issues applied to in personam jurisdiction as well as subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. at 798 n.4. Hoisager was decided in the period between Risjord and
Northern Pipeline, so it is difficult to determine how the addition of Northern Pipeine affects the
reasoning of Holzmager.
286. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
287. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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sions on the exclusionary rule prospective. 2 88 Peltier, however, proved to be
different, and that difference caused lower courts more than a little tribulation
for seven years.
When Peltier had been before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
that court had opted for retroactivity on the ground that the substantive law at
issue had not altered sufficiently to justify prospectivity. 289 The dissenters, in
turn, argued that the law-changing case erased a line of circuit court decisions
as well as existing statutes and regulations approving the warrantless
search. 290 The Supreme Court, however, gave little emphasis to the dispute
over whether the law had changed sufficiently and concentrated instead upon
the nature of the exclusionary rule and its particular requirements in the context of retroactivity. 29 1 The result was an analysis that departed somewhat
from the standard Linkletter/Stovall approach. Although the majority opinion
professed adherence to Linkletter,292 Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in Peltier
was rather special:
Whether or not the exclusionary rule should be applied to the roving
border patrol search conducted in this case, then, depends on
whether considerations of either judicial integrity or deterrence of
Fourth Amendment violations are sufficiently weighty to require that
the evidence
obtained by the Border Patrol in this case be
293
excluded.
In a nutshell that passage summarized the three foundations of the majority's
holding: (1)
the presence of a fourth amendment exclusionary rule problem;
(2) the integrity of the judicial process; and (3) the prospect that unlawful police behavior might be deterred. Notably absent, as Justice Brennan's dissent
pointed out, was any recognition of a requirement that the decision at issue be
something substantially new before a claim of prospectivity could be invoked. 294 Justice Brennan also accused the majority of establishing a separate
prospectivity rule applicable only to the fourth amendment and of "stand[ing]
the Linkletter holding on its head by creating a class of cases in which nonret' 295
roactivity is the rule and not, as heretofore, the exception.
Given the language used by both majority and minority, it would have
been surprising if some lower courts had not concluded that Peltier established
a special rule of retroactivity analysis for exclusionary-rule cases. A number
of circuits did precisely that. Perhaps the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that position most baldly:
We do not reach the question of whether or not a change in search
and seizure law has occurred. The Supreme Court has held that
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

422 U.S. at 535.
500 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id.
422 U.S. at 535-39.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 544-49.
Id. at 550.
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changes in the law of search and seizure are not retroactive where
evidence seized by authorities was296in good faith compliance with
then existing constitutional norms.
Other courts acted as though Peltier had changed nothing, 297 a view the
Supreme Court would ultimately ratify in UnitedStates v. Johnson.298

In Johnson, however, the majority was unable to avoid dissembling. Justice Blackmun, who had joined the majority in Peltier, wrote for a majority in
Johnson that included the only two Peltier dissenters remaining on the Court,
Justices Brennan and Marshall. The Johnson majority adopted its own special
rule for fourth amendment cases on direct appeal. Unlike Peltier, however,
which had also been a case on direct appeal, 299 the new rule was one of retroactivity.3°° Moreover, and also with the assent of the two justices who had
dissented in Peltier, the five-justice majority in Johnson explained that far
from being a new approach, "Peltier resembles several earlier decisions that
held 'new' Fourth Amendment doctrine nonretroactive, not on the ground that
all Fourth Amendment rulings apply only prospectively, but because the particular decisions being applied 'so change[d] the law that prospectivity [was]
296. United States v. Kranzthor, 614 F.2d 981, 982 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (citing Peltier).
Accord Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Escalante, 554 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,434 U.S. 862 (1977); United
States v. Martinez, 526 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc); cf. United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798,
803 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("special retroactivity doctrines affecting the exclusionary rule stated
in United States v. Peltier" are irrelevant in retroactivity case involving law of entrapment), cert.
deniedsub nom. Robles v. United States, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
297. Some cases reject the distinction explicitly, while others do so simply by using the standard Linkletter or Che'ron doctrine in the course of an analysis. An example of the former is
United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1163 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rep'don othergrounds, 102 S.Ct.
2157 (1982):
It is true that the Court in Peltier did not set out this [novel] consideration as a separate
inquiry, directing the courts instead to ask whether the police officer knew or should
have known that his conduct was in accordance with the law. We believe, however, that
the former inquiry is subsumed in the latter. If a decision develops no new law, then the
police officer-who is charged with knowledge of the old law-should have known, and
acted in a manner consistent with, the core doctrine.
See also United States v. Schleis: "While the meaning of the Court's language is not entirely clear,
we do not read UnitedStates v. Peltier. . .as reflecting a new approach that an exclusionary rule
would only be applied in cases of bad faith violations of the Fourth Amendment." 582 F.2d 1166,
1174 n.7 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
Cases implicitly treating Peltier as merely a part of the Linkletter/Stoyall line include United
States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219 (2d Cir.), (citing Linkletier and Peltier),cert. denied sub nom.
Crespo v. United States, 442 U.S. 919 (1979); United States v. Walker, 569 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978); United States v. Lenardo, 420 F. Supp. 1148 (D.N.J.
1976) (same). The apparent inconsistency in the view of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Walker, United States v. Escalante, 554 F.2d 970 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862
(1977), and United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Robles v.
United States, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977), is explained because the court has taken something of a
unique view of Peltier,viewing it on the one hand as different and special to the exclusionary rule,
but on the other hand as maintaining the requirement that there be a significant change in the law
before prospectivity may be granted. For the retention of the novelty requirement, see Escalante,
554 F.2d at 973, and Hart, 546 F.2d at 803. For those readers unsatisfied with this explanation, it
may be of interest that two of the judges who decided Walker sat on the en banc decisions in
Escalante and Hart. Walker does not cite either of the earlier cases.
298. 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2591-94 (1982).
299. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 552 n.10 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
300. 102 S.Ct. at 2594. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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arguably the proper course.' "301 Eight years ago Peltier presented itself as a
new, special-purpose retroactivity analysis, and a number of lower courts took
the decision at its word. More recently, those courts learned that for reasons
related only tangentially to retroactivity, the opinion in Peltier is now held not
to mean what it apparently said.
III.

CONCLUSION

Conclusions about the state of retroactivity analysis in the federal courts
can proceed along a number of lines, but some considerations will emerge as
crucial regardless of the approach selected. Certainly it is clear that current
retroactivity doctrines are complex and exist in uneasy harmony. Like an
emulsion, the various approaches seem suspended in one configuration only
until even a minor change occurs; then the entire structure may shift substantially before resting in some new, perhaps unforeseen, posture. That circumstance, of course, only highlights the impressive dedication circuit and district
court judges have brought to their responsibility to follow the twisting, diverg-

ing, interlocking, and changing precedent the Supreme Court has established.
That is not to say, of course, that lower courts are immune from error, or even
outright carelessness. A sufficient number of cases demonstrates the contrary. 30 2 But for the most part, a reasonable conclusion would be that lower
court judges have worked hard at their assigned task.
301. Id. at 2592 (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 659 (1971); alterations by
Court). Indeed, Justice Blackmun reasoned that to adopt the other view of Peltierwould make all
exclusionary rule decisions prospective. Id. at 2593. That, of course, may have been precisely
what Justice Rehnquist had in mind when he fashioned the majority opinion in Peltier.
. 302. For example, in 1972, six months after the decision of the Supreme Court in Chevron, a
three-judge district court in Illinois decided a class-action for retroactive money payments to persons whom the state had not previously paid. The refusal of the state to pay had meanwhile been
reversed as unconstitutional. When the state sought to use Linkletter/Stovall to argue for prospectivity, the court held that Linkletter and its progeny had developed in the context of criminal cases
not strictly applicable to civil matters. Moreover, citing a 1968 case from the Linkletter line, the
district court opined that the Supreme Court did not anticipate application of the three-tiered
retroactivity analysis to civil cases. Then the court concluded that retroactivity was more appropriate because, inter alia, the right to receive the money had "vested" in the plaintiffs. Alexander
1972) (three-judge court), vacated andremanded on
v. Weaver, 345 F. Supp. 666, 671 (N.D. Ill.
othergrounds,412 U.S. 914 (1973). A year later, another district court, adjudicating a civil suit for
monetary damages and an injunction in which retroactivity was an issue, wrote, "We note that all
of the recent United States Supreme Court opinions dealing with the retroactivity problem have
involved criminal procedures, not civil suits for monetary compensation and equitable relief."
United States ex rel Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 950 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Interestingly, both of
the foregoing opinions were otherwise well reasoned.
Other courts, from time to time, appear to have felt free to develop their own rules of retroactivity. In United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917
(1979), for example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached its own special retroactivity result. The issue in James was the standard to be followed in determining the admissibility at
trial of out-of-court statements by alleged coconspirators. The court used this case to overrule the
prevailing test, but casually made its new rule effective only "in trials commencing after 30 days
from the date of this opinion." Id. at 583. The court indulged in no further discussion of retroactivity, leaving us to ponder how much impression the Supreme Court made when it restated in
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 2323 (1977), its rule that in matters in which the purpose
of a new decision goes substantially to more accurate determinations of truth at trial, retroactivity
is likely to be the result. See also National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1118, 1132
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (four relevant criteria to be used for retroactivity analysis--justifiable reliance,"
purpose of new rule, "degree of finality of plaintiff's transaction," and "element of surprise").
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It would seem to follow that blame for whatever shortcomings may exist
should properly be placed on the Supreme Court. In several important ways it
is true that much of the confusion, both current and over the preceeding decade, is the product of several weaknesses in the approach of the Supreme
Court to retroactivity. The Court has, for example, failed to provide any reasonable justification for its distinction between cases subject to Schooner
Peggy and those governed by Chevron. It is easy to predict the result in a
SchoonerPeggy situation, and almost as easy to determine when the situation
arises, but there has yet to be a valid explanation of the logic or reason why
that rule and Chevron should coexist.
That odd amalgam of history and more recent jurisprudential thought
aside, retroactivity analysis also shows an unfortunate side to the manner in
which the Supreme Court undertakes to make rules. Some years ago Justice
Harlan candidly acknowledged that he had viewed prospectivity less as a principled doctrine to be developed than as an opportunity to restrict the influence
of substantive decisions with which he disagreed. 30 3 Justice Harlan subsequently abjured that approach, 3 °4 but the subplot concerning retroactivity in
exclusionary rule matters that may recently have presented itself305 gives rise
to a suspicion that something like Justice Harlan's earlier practice is still in
evidence among the various factions on the Court.
Perhaps most disturbing of all has been the occasional quiet disregard by
the Court of its own precedent, or even of its obligation to establish precedent.
The former problem arose most recently in the conflict between the retroactivity approaches of Risord and Northern Pipeline.30 6 Perhaps it is wrong to
term the inconsistency a conflict, for in Northern Pipeine the Court simply
ignored altogether the clear principle upon which Risjord rested, presumably
because in Northern Pipeline that principle would have led to unpalatable results. Such turnabouts are difficult enough for the lower courts, but it is more
difficult still when the Supreme Court simply refuses to accept its rulemaking
function-as it did in Diedrich, in which Chief Justice Burger advised all who
might be interested that tax decisions are "frequently" retroactive. 30 7
Criticism of flaws in Supreme Court doctrine must, in fairness, be tempered by a recognition that developing rules for retroactivity analysis has
never been an easy matter.30 8 Indeed, simplicity would have dictated that we
settle for the old Blackstonian approach, which offered little but simplicity.
But in the course of developing fairer, and necessarily more complex rules, the
Supreme Court may have made the job of the lower courts more difficult than
303. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
noted, "I have in the past joined in some of those opinions which have, in so short a time, generated so many incompatible rules and inconsistent principles. I did so because I thought it impor-

tant to limit the impact of constitutional decisions which seemed to me profoundly unsound in
principle." Id. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
304. Id.
305. See supra notes 286-301 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 50-60, 103-06 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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it needs to be. Throughout the nearly two decades since Linkletter, the Court
has concentrated exclusively upon developing doctrine. It has, in words Justice Harlan used to describe another phenomenon, "fish[ed] one case from the
stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards," 30 9 without systematically examining how well the doctrine
has worked in the lower courts. Left largely to their own devices, the lower
courts have managed fairly well, but the absence of supervision permitted a
growth of inconsistencies and apparent divergence from the basic doctrines of
retroactivity-particularly in the area of Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron-that
has gone unchecked. It may be, as some have suggested, that the Supreme
Court carries too heavy a workload to provide the sort of systematic supervision of the lower courts that is necessary. 3 10 Certainly it is true, however, that
without such supervision the goal of developing and applying coherent doctrines in such areas as retroactivity is unlikely to be reached.
Retroactivity analysis also holds a lesson for those of us who, by virtue of
employment or disposition, feel called upon to comment at length upon the
workings of American courts. Writers addressing the state of progress of the
federal courts in the area of retroactivity have concentrated primarily upon the
development of doctrine at the Supreme Court level.3 11 The work produced
has almost invariably been thoughtful and probably useful to the Supreme
Court in its own efforts to produce doctrine. 3 12 At the same time, however,
commentators have often ignored the administrative underpinnings of the
doctrine,3 13 and that is a loss. The fact is that of two tasks before the Supreme
Court-development of doctrine and supervision of the application of doctrine in the lower courts-the second seems to have been less well performed.
The reason for that shortcoming may in part lie in the inability of the Court to
devote sufficient resources to its monitoring function. Whatever the cause, it is
scholarly commentators who have the time and resources necessary to assist in
identifying problems in application of rules, and it is to that more tedious but
vital task 3 14 that more effort should be directed. Doctrine remains, after all,
only as good as its use.

309. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
310. See, e.g., Stevens, Some Thoughts on JudicialRestraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177 (1982).
311. See supra note 14.
312. It is difficult to read Note, Prospective Overrulingand Retroactive Application in the FederalCourts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962), and not believe that the author's careful work influenced the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Linkletter.
313. A notable exception is Beytagh, supra note 11, which puts forward the proposal that
when the Supreme Court alters the law, it should hold a hearing to determine whether its new

holding should apply retroactively.
314. For any who question the importance of the job, a simple test would be in order. That
test would begin with reading a fair sampling of the circuit and district court opinions in the area
ofretroactivity while ignoring any thought of Supreme Court doctrine. The second part of the test
would be to construct retroactivity doctrines solely from the sampling of lower-court opinions.
The third part of the test would be to determine what similarity, if any, lower-court doctrine had
to contemporary Supreme Court doctrine.

